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WHO'S TALKING? DISENTANGLING
GOVERNMENT AND PRIVATE SPEECH
Leslie GielowJacobs*
Several different constitutional rules apply to government actions that influence
the content of speech. The government has far more discretion to determine
speech content when the government itself is the speaker than when it regulates
private speakers. Specifically, in the former circumstance, the government can
discriminate according to viewpoint, whereas in the latter circumstance it can-
not. While the application of the rules may be obvious when either the
government or private entities speak alone, increasingly, through various differ-
ent types of interactions, government and private groups or individuals are
speaking together. This circumstance complicates the crucial constitutional de-
termination, which is: who's talking?
This Article sets out the analysis necessary to make the speaker determination
when government and private entities speak together. The different rules that
limit government influence on the content of government and private speech ex-
ist because of the different constitutional values that attach to them. These
values suggest characteristics that render government speech legitimate. Only
when these characteristics exist in a government/private speech interaction
should the more lenient constitutional rules-rules that allow viewpoint dis-
criminatory government influence over speech content-apply. Otherwise, the
more strict rules should limit government influence over speech content. This
Article examines a number of different types of government/private speech inter-
actions, identifying how variations in their structures determine the
government's constitutional discretion to influence speech content.
INTRODUCTION
The constitutional rules that limit government action vary
dramatically according to whether the government itself speaks or
whether it regulates private speakers.' As to the former, the
government's discretion to choose among topics and viewpoints, to
* Professor, University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law; BA 1982, Wesleyan
University;J.D. 1985, University of Michigan Law School. I presented this Article on October 4,
2001, as a Distinguished Speaker in McGeorge's 9th Annual Distinguished Speakers Series.
1. The First Amendment is the textual limit on the government's action restricting
speech. U.S. CONST. AMEND. I ("Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of
speech.").
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teach, persuade or inform, is practically unlimited.! When the
government speaks for itself, the political process, and not the
Constitution, is the primary check on what is said .
This broad discretion does not apply, however, in the latter cir-
cumstance, where the government sets rules that impact private
speakers.4  The Constitution prohibits the government from
"abridg[ing] the freedom of speech. 5 This means that the gov-
ernment generally cannot favor or disfavor private messages.6 It is
the nongovernmental marketplace of ideas that must pass on their
worth.
While the application of the Free Speech Clause is to limit
government action, its effect with respect to speech is actually
more complex. In particular, the government's broad authority to
speak on its own behalf exists because private speech, which forms
the basis and legitimacy of the democratic government, is free."This relationship between private and governmental speech, which
2. See Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 541 (2001) ("[V]iewpoint-based
funding decisions can be sustained in instances in which the government is itself the
speaker."); Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 229 (2000)
(acknowledging the theory that the "government can speak for itself"); Rosenberger v. Rec-
tor & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995) ("[Wlhen the government
appropriates public funds to promote a particular policy of its own it is entitled to say what it
wishes." (citing Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 194 (1991))); MARK G. YUDOF, WHEN Gov-
ERNMENT SPEAKS 14 (1983) ("[T]here are a variety of ways government may attempt to
influence behavior in accordance with its legitimate authority."); David Cole, Beyond Uncon-
stitutional Conditions: Charting Spheres of Neutrality in Government-Funded Speech, 67 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 675, 681 (1992) ("[Nlon-neutral government support of speech is often necessary in
running a democratic government.").
3. See, e.g., Southworth, 529 U.S. at 235 ("When the government speaks, for instance to
promote its own policies or to advance a particular idea, it is, in the end, accountable to the
electorate and the political process for its advocacy.").
4. See, e.g., Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 534 (noting that a government program's purpose is
to facilitate private speech, which distinguishes it from instances of government funding
where "viewpoint-based restrictions are proper" (quoting Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 834)).
5. U.S. CONST. AMEND. I. The Free Speech Clause applies to the states through the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666
(1925).
6. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 386 (1992) ("[T]he government may not
regulate [private speech] based on hostility-or favoritism-towards the underlying message
expressed.").
7. See Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 50 (1988) (noting "the fundamental
importance of the free flow of ideas and opinions on matters of public interest and con-
cern").
8. See, e.g., Robert C. Post, Subsidized Speech, 106 YALE L.J. 151, 153 (1996) ("A democ-
ratic government derives its legitimacy from the fact that it is considered responsive to its
citizens.... We would rightly regard a government that treated its citizens as mere instru-
mentalities of the state-'closed-circuit recipients of only that which the state chooses to
communicate,'-as totalitarian rather than democratic." (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines
Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969))).
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depends upon different rules applying to each, makes it important
to determine the boundary between them."
The problem, of course, is that however crisp the doctrinal cate-
gories, their real-life manifestations are more muddy.' Rather than
acting separately and distinctly, government more often interacts
with private speakers. It may, for example, give private speakers
access to property," media access,' 2 financial assistance, 13 or ac-
knowledgment of their assistance in a government program.' 4 The
result is speech that enters and impacts the marketplace of ideas.
The dilemma for purposes of constitutional analysis is that it be-
comes difficult to determine who's talking.
15
For example, who's talking when the government produces and
erects signs on government property that advertise a private
speaker's identity or suggested motto? Courts have differed as to
whether states can refuse to erect signs acknowledging the Ku Klux
Klan as an Adopt-A-Highway participant. 16 One court has held that
9. See YUDOF, supra note 2, at 15 ("There is the danger that government communica-
tions will be employed to falsify consent. In a democratic polity, it is one thing to employ
mass communications to implement decisions that in some loose sense represent the majority
will. It is quite another thing to attempt to fashion a majority will through uncontrolled in-
doctrination activities. The line is a blurred one.").
10. See, e.g., Gentala v. City of Tucson, 244 F.3d 1065, 1073 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc),
vacated and remanded by 534 U.S. 946 (2001) (describing the two "mutually exclusive Free
Speech Clause paradigms" of government speech and private speech, and noting that, un-
der the facts of the case before it involving city funding of private expression, "[e]ach of
these opposing characterizations of the [C]ity's role ... has some considerations in its fa-
vor," labeling the choice between the paradigms "a difficult one," and finding it unnecessary
to make because other grounds support the city's action).
11. E.g., Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 758 (1995)
(noting that a state-owned plaza may be made available to "a broad range of [private]
speakers").
12. E.g., Ark. Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 674 (1998) (noting
that a state-owned public television broadcaster may use discretion to determine access to a
candidate debate).
13. Nat'l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 573 (1998) (noting that Con-
gress may authorize the National Endowment for the Arts to fund certain private artists).
14. E.g., Cuffley v. Mickes, 208 E3d 702, 712 (8th Cir. 2000) (noting that a state may
acknowledge private groups that participate in its Adopt-A-Highway program).
15. See, e.g., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc. v. Holcomb, 288 F.3d 610, 616 (4th Cir.
2002) (addressing the issue of "who's speaking" in the context of specialty license plates).
16. See Suzanne Stone Montgomery, Note, When the Klan Adopts-A-Highway: The Weak-
nesses of the Public Forum Doctrine Exposed, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 557, 558 (1999) ("[In recent
Adopt-A-Highway cases], four different federal courts, confronted with three substantially
similar programs, approached the public forum doctrine in five different ways." (footnotes
omitted)).
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New York City must create and erect a sign renaming a street with a
private group's requested political message."
What about when the government creates and sells vehicle li-
cense plates? The Supreme Court held a number of years ago that
New Hampshire could not force a private individual to become an
unwilling "courier" of the state's "Live Free or Die" message." Now,
courts are holding that states must manufacture and distribute
"specialty"' 9 and "vanity"20 license plates with messages and symbols
that states do not want to appear on "their" official plates. States,
however, argue that license plate speech is their own.21 The Oregon
Court of Appeals, sitting en banc, recently accepted this argu-
ment.
22
Who's talking when the government sells advertising space or
time to support its operations? Numerous courts have held that
public transit authorities must accept "offensive" advertisements
despite municipal authorities' desires to exclude them.23 The
Eighth Circuit, however, has held that a Missouri public radio sta-
tion may refuse to acknowledge the Ku Klux Klan as a program
underwriter because such acknowledgments "constitute govern-
mental speech."
2 4
What about when governments devote public funds to promote
private expression that they consider, for one reason or another, to
17. East Timor Action Network v. City of New York, 71 F. Supp. 2d 334, 348 (S.D.N.Y
1999) (holding that the city's denial of "Free East Timor" and "1991 Santa Cruz Massacre"
signs near Indonesian Consulate violates the Free Speech Clause).
18. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 701, 717 (1977).
19. See, e.g., Holcomb, 288 E3d at 629 (holding that the state must issue a specialty li-
cense plate with a Confederate flag logo).
20. See, e.g., Lewis v. Wilson, 253 E3d 1077, 1082-83 (8th Cir. 2001) (holding that the
district court unconstitutionally refused to grant an injunction requiring Missouri to issue
ARYAN-I vanity plate).
21. See, e.g., Henderson v. Stadler, 112 E Supp. 2d 589, 595 (E.D. La. 2000) (noting
that Louisiana argued that each specialty license plate, because it is authorized "through
[the state's] democratic process of legislative enactments," contains an "official statutory
message[] by the state itself (quoting Defs.' Mem. in Opp'n, at 9)).
22. Denial of the Application for the Custom Plates "WINE" "INVINO" "VINO" of Mi-
chael Paul Higgins v. Driver & Motor Vehicle Servs. Branch, 13 P.3d 531, 534 (Ore. Ct. App.
2000) (en banc) ("We believe that the proper course is to view the communication that
occurs on state license plates, including custom plates, as state communication rather than
as communication by the plate holders or a combination of both.").
23. E.g., Christ's Bride Ministries, Inc. v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth., 148 E3d 242
(3d Cir. 1998) (holding that the transportation authority cannot remove an anti-abortion
advertisement); Air Line Pilots Ass'n. v. Dep't of Aviation, 45 E3d 1144 (7th Cir. 1995)
(holding that the city must accept union's advertisement critical of an airline in airport
display case); AIDS Action Comm. of Mass., Inc. v. Mass. Bay Transp. Auth., 42 F.3d 1 (1st
Cir. 1994) (holding that the transportation authority cannot refuse to accept condom adver-
tisements).




be of high public worth? Courts have held that Congress can de-
cide that the National Endowment for the Arts should use
"decency" as a criterion for selecting the private artists who will re-
ceive federal funding,2" but a public university cannot decide that
its student publications funding should not go to those groups that
are primarily religious. 6
So what happens when a city decides to co-sponsor, through a
civic events fund that provides in-kind services, privately organized
events that it determines likely to "generate broad community ap-
peal"?27 A Ninth Circuit panel split on whether the city of Tucson
could refuse to co-sponsor a national day of prayer-the two judge
majority holding that the Free Speech Clause required it to do so.28
The Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, characterized the Free Speech
Clause issue as a difficult one, and upheld the city's discretion to
refuse to co-sponsor the event on other grounds.2 9
New York City's rejection of a proposed sculpture for its Cow-
Parade raised a similar controversy."' The city claimed that the
explicit and violent anti-meat quotes that appeared in the design
did not fit with the festive theme that it sought for its event.3 ' The
animal rights group that sought to sponsor the cow sculpture ar-
gued that the City's decision represented unconstitutional
viewpoint discrimination in a private speech forum. 2 The district
court denied a preliminary injunction forcing the City to display
the proposed cow and the event has since ended .
In all of these instances, the primary constitutional question is
the scope of the government's discretion to discriminate according
to the viewpoint of private speakers when it chooses to assist them.
25. Nat'l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 586 (1998).
26. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
27. Gentala v. City of Tuscon, 244 F.3d 1065, 1068 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc), vacated
and remanded by 53 4 U.S. 946 (2001).
28. Compare Gentala v. City of Tuscon, 213 F.3d 1055, 1065 (9th Cir. 2000) (Sneed &
Carter, I].), vacated by 244 F3d 1065 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that rejection of an application
for National Prayer Day event was "impermissible viewpoint discrimination."), with id. at
1075 (Pregerson,J., dissenting) ("The majority's analysis of this case using forum doctrine is
not appropriate because the Civic Events Fund is not a forum at all.").
29. Gentala, 244 E3d at 1073 (noting that even assuming that the Free Speech Clause
alone would require the city to co-sponsor the event, the Establishment Clause provides "a
sufficiently compelling reason" to justify the city's action.).
30. People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v. Giuliani, 105 F. Supp. 2d 294, 301
(S.D.N.Y. 2000).
31. Id. at 301 ("'What troubled the committee was the provocative, graphic, offensive
effect of the text chosen.'" (quoting Aff. of David Slarsky, 14)).
32. Id. at 304.
33. Id. at 298, 336 (The CowParade began on June 15, 2000 and ended on September
3,2000.).
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Resolving the scope of the government's discretion depends upon
identifying the nature of the speech produced.34 Does the aid
"promote a governmental message" or does it simply "facilitate pri-
vate speech"?
35
This Article sets out the analysis necessary to make the crucial
determination in government/private speech interactions of who's
talking. Part I explains the current boundaries of government and
private speech, and the constitutional rules that apply to each. Part
II uses the values that underpin the categories of government and
private speech to identify the characteristics that render govern-
ment speech legitimate. Part III applies this analysis to the
examples listed above to show how variations in similar types of
government/private speech interactions can lead to different con-
stitutional results.
I. TYPES OF GOVERNMENT/PRIVATE SPEECH INTERACTIONS
Government speech occurs when officials and entities at the lo-
cal, state, and federal level36 communicate in myriad ways37 with
their constituents, among themselves, or with foreign entities.
When the government speaks in this way-through elected offi-
cials, designated government employees, or officially constituted
bodies-it is fairly easy to tell who's talking.3
When it is clear that the government is talking, its discretion to
discriminate among the topics and viewpoints that it presents is
34. See Legal Servs. Corp. v Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 542 (2001) ("Neither the latitude
for government speech nor its rationale applies to subsidies for private speech in every in-
stance, however.").
35. Id. (finding determinative that the government funding at issue "was designed to
facilitate private speech, not to promote a governmental message").
36. See YUDOF, supra note 2, at 13 ("Though government is used in the singular ...
[g]overnment speech ... include[s] organized (local, state, and federal) governments'
efforts to communicate symbols, ideas, information, perceptions, and values to the citi-
zenry.").
37. Id. ("The modes and types of government discourse include time-honored meth-
ods as well as those provided by modern technology: direct access to the broadcast media,
mass distribution of documents, speeches and other activities of political leaders reported in
the private media, the gathering and dissemination of statistics and research results, adver-
tising, preparation and dissemination of official reports, activities of government public-
relations offices, dissemination of official records of government proceedings, press confer-
ences, public schooling, military training, and so on.").
38. See Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 235 (distin-
guishing funded student speech at issue from speech of "the University or its agents").
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very broad."' This broad discretion stems from the fact that gov-
ernment speech bears a democratic pedigree. 40 Government at all
levels must speak to function effectively.4' Effective functioning ful-
fills the democratic ideal of a government responsive to the will of
the people who created it. The government thus can speak for the
people, which means discriminating in its speech among topics
and viewpoints so that it presents those that reflect the majority's
will. 42
By contrast, quintessentially "private" speech occurs when indi-
viduals and nongovernmental entities speak for themselves on
private property with private resources.3 When the government
does not assist private speakers by offering them access to govern-
mental property44 or financial aid, 4 either through funding46 or•47
discount, it is similarly nonproblematic to identify the speaker as
private.
The government's discretion to discriminate among the topics
and viewpoints of private speakers is dramatically more limited
than its ability to do so in its own communication.48 Government
39. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995)
("[W]hen the State is the speaker, it may make content-based choices."); see also Nat'l En-
dowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 610-11 (1998) (Souter, J., dissenting)
(acknowledging "the role[] of government-as-speaker ... , in which the government is of
course entitled to engage in viewpoint discrimination"); Cole, supra note 2, at 681 ("While
non-neutral prohibitions on speech are only rarely justified, non-neutral government sup-
port of speech is often necessary in running a democratic government.").
40. See Southworth, 529 U.S. at 235.
41. See Steven Shiffrin, Government Speech, 27 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 565, 606 ("Government
has legitimate interests in informing, in educating, and in persuading.").
42. See Southworth, 529 U.S. at 235 ("When the government speaks, for instance to
promote its own policies or to advance a particular idea, it is, in the end, accountable to the
electorate and the political process for its advocacy. If the citizenry objects, newly elected
officials later could espouse some different or contrary position.").
43. See, e.g., City of Ladue v Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43 (1994) (holding that residential signs
are private speech).
44. See Int'l Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 678 (1992)
(discussing the law relating to what "forms of speech" government must permit "on property
that it owns and controls").
45. The National Endowment for the Arts provides grants to artists. Nat'l Endowment
for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 573 (1998).
46. See id.; Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 822
(1995) (noting that the University of Virginia's student activities fund supported student
publications).
47. See YUDOF, supra note 2, at 234-35 (discussing the second class mailing discount as
a government-provided speech subsidy); see also Hannegan v. Esquire, Inc., 327 U.S. 146,151
(1946) ("The second-class [mailing] privilege is a form of a subsidy.").
48. See Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 548-49 (2001) ("Where private
speech is involved, even Congress' antecedent funding decision cannot be aimed at the
suppression of ideas thought inimical to the Government's own interest.").
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restrictions of private speech can depend upon its content-either
subject matter or viewpoint-only in certain, very limited circum-
stances.49 Content-based restrictions are valid only if they can
survive strict judicial scrutiny. 50 Even content-neutral restrictions
must survive a mid-level judicial review. 1
The reason for such limited governmental discretion to dis-
criminate among private speakers is the fear that underpins the
First Amendment of government censorship in the private speech
market.' Free speech leads to a number of individual and group-
based goods. Free speech is crucial in a democracy because,
where the government skews the private speech market, it skews-, 54
the basis of the consent that renders it legitimate. The ideal of
democracy commands both the broad discretion that the govern-
ment has to discriminate in its own speech and its very limited
discretion to restrict the speech that creates it.
Between these extremes of "pure" government and private
speech lies the middle ground of government/private speech
interactions. In these interactions, the government provides a
benefit to private speakers-either access to government property
or funding. The result is speech of mixed origin, generated both
by private speakers and by government largesse." When
49. See R.A.V. N City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382-83 (1992) (noting that although
"[c]ontent-based regulations are presumptively invalid .... our society ... has permitted
restrictions upon the content of speech in a few limited areas...").
50. See United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 879 (2000) ("If a
statute regulates speech based on its content, it must be narrowly tailored to promote a
compelling Government interest.").
51. See, e.g., Ward %: Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) ("[G]overnment
may impose reasonable restrictions on the time, place, or manner of protected speech, pro-
vided the restrictions 'are justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech,
that they are narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, and that they
leave open ample alterative channels for communication of the information.'" (quoting
Clark v: Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984))).
52. See First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 785-86 (1978) ("Especially
where ... the legislature's suppression of speech suggests an attempt to give one side of a
debatable public question an advantage in expressing its views to the people, the First
Amendment is offended.").
53. See Kent Greenawalt, Free SpeechJustications, 89 CoLuM. L. REV. 119, 131-34 (1989)
(discussing the justifications for the free speech guarantee).
54. See Legal Servs. Corp. v Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 548 (2001) ("'We must be vigilant
when Congress imposes rules and conditions which in effect insulate its own laws from le-
gitimate judicial challenge."); YUDOF, supra note 2, at 15 ("[The danger of the]
government's sweeping power to communicate ... [is] that government communications
will be employed to falsify consent.").
55. See, e.g., Gentala v. City of Tucson, 244 E3d 1065, 1073 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc),
vacated and remanded, 534 U.S. 946 (2001). In Gentala, characterization of the city's civic
events fund as either government or private speech was "difficult" because "[e]ach of these
opposing characterizations ... has some considerations in its favor." Id. On the one hand,
the practice of "providing in-kind services for a wide range of speakers" does not have "the
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government assistance transforms the product into government
speech, it can engage in what would otherwise be prohibited
viewpoint discrimination among private speakers.5 r Not every
selective assistance program, however, constitutes government
speech.
A. Primarily Private
1. Private Speech Forums-The primary instance where private
speech, although government-assisted, remains fundamentally pri-
vate5' is where the government "expends funds to encourage a
diversity of views from private speakers""' by creating and adminis-
tering a private speech forum." The doctrinal creation of the
traditional public forum recognizes the government's obligation to
hold certain pieces of property, traditionally dedicated to private
expression, open for such expression regardless of the govern-
ment's intent to promote private expression. 6 ' Despite the fact that
the private speakers receive the "subsidy" of property access, their
very strong element of qualitative governmental selectivity involved [in cases finding a gov-
ernment speech interest]." Id. "On the other hand, the criteria for funding are more
selective than [the criteria in those cases]" and "the City affirmatively identifies itself as the
sponsor of funded events, placing its imprimatur on the events in a manner somewhat like
the editor of an anthology.. ." Id. See also Denial of the Application for the Custom Plates
"WINE" "INVINO" WINO" of Michael Paul Higgins v. Driver & Motor Vehicle Servs.
Branch, 13 P.3d 531, 533-34 (Ore. Ct. App. 2000) (en banc) ("The problem presented by
this case [challenging a state's denial of various wine-related vanity license plate configura-
tions] is that the communication at issue is a communication by both petitioner and the
state.") (emphasis in the original).
56. Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 541 ("[V]iewpoint-based funding decisions can be sustained
in instances in which the government is itself the speaker ... or instances .. . in which the
government 'used private speakers to transmit specific information pertaining to its own
program.'" (quoting Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833
(1995))).
57. Id. at 542 (Although government funding of private speakers does not create a
speech forum, private speech protections still apply because the program "was designed to
facilitate private speech, not to promote a governmental message.").
58. Rosenberger %% Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 834 (1995).
59. See id. (noting that government does not speak when it "expends funds to encour-
age a diversity of views from private speakers" and instead creates a private speech forum).
60. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983) (noting
that traditional public forums "by long tradition or by government fiat have been devoted to
assembly and debate").
61. Ark. Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 678 (1998) ("[T]raditional
public fora are open for expressive activity regardless of the government's intent.").
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speech remains their own. Absent a compelling purpose and
means narrowly drawn to achieve it, the government cannot dis-
criminate according to the speaker's content.
6
3
Other forums exist because the government, in one way or
another, intends to promote private expression.64 The intent to
promote private expression, however, is not enough to transform it
into government speech.65 Constitutional doctrine recognizes a
difference between government-assisted private speech and "pure"
private speech by allowing the government to define its assistance
program to fulfill its legitimate interests.66  So, where the
government creates a "forum" for private speakers, it can limit
access according to the content of the speech or the status of the
62. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 200 (1991) ("[T]he existence of a Government 'sub-
sidy,' in the form of Government-owned property, does not justify the restriction of speech
in [traditional public forums].").
63. Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 678 (1992)
("[R]egulation of speech on government property that has traditionally been available for
public expression is subject to the highest scrutiny. Such regulations survive only if they are
narrowly drawn to achieve a compelling state interest.").
64. Forbes, 523 U.S. at 677, 679 (holding that the government creates a designated pub-
lic forum when it "'intentionally open[s] a nontraditional public forum for public
discourse,'" and creates a nonpublic forum when it "allows selective access for individual
speakers" (quoting Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788,802
(1985))). The "designated" and "nonpublic" forums differ according to whether the gov-
ernment grants "general" or "selective" access to private speakers. Id. at 679. This difference
supposedly translates into different constitutional rules that apply to each. Lee, 505 U.S. at
678-79 ("Regulation of [a designated public forum] is subject to the same limitations as that
governing a traditional public forum .... [However, 1]imitations on expressive activity con-
ducted in this last [nonpublic forum] category ... must survive only a much more limited
review."). But, in creating either type of forum in the first instance, the government can
define its contours according to any criteria that are not viewpoint-based. See Forbes, 523 U.S.
at 681 (involving a nonpublic forum); Perry, 460 U.S. at 46 n.7 (involving a designated pub-
lic forum). So, rather than putting different limits on the scope of the government's
discretion to discriminate among private speakers, the two labels merely describe different
scopes of access that the government intended when creating the two types of forums. See
Cornelius 473 U.S. at 825-27 (Blackmun,J., dissenting) (recognizing that the wide range of
discretion that the government has to designate a forum makes a "limited" or "designated"
public forum indistinguishable from a nonpublic forum).
65. Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 542 (holding that government fund-
ing of private speech does not produce government speech when it is "designed to facilitate
private speech, not to promote a governmental message").
66. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995)
("[T]here is no question that the [government], like the private owner of property, may
legally preserve the property under its control for the use to which it is dedicated.") (quot-
ing Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 390 (1993)); Regan
v. Taxation With Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 549 (1983) ("Congressional selec-
tion of particular entities or persons for entitlement to [tax benefit] largesse [including
selective subsidies for lobbying] 'is obviously a matter of policy and discretion.'" (quoting
United States v. Realty Co., 163 U.S. 427, 444 (1896))).
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speakers.67 It cannot, however, discriminate according to viewpoint,
because the speech, although subsidized, remains private. 6s
2. Selective Benefits and Conditions-The other type of govern-
ment/private speech interaction where speech remains private
occurs when the government assists or burdens certain private
speakers without intending to impact the speech market. As when
it creates a private speech forum-so too when it selectively bene-
fits or conditions private speech-the government can do so
according to criteria that do not relate to the speakers' view-
points. 69
In Regan v. Taxation With Representation of Wash.,7" the Court
upheld a federal statute that subsidized the lobbying activities of
veterans' organizations only.7 It rejected the claim that the failure to
subsidize the challenging group's lobbying activities "'penaliz [ed]"'
their speech. 72 According to the Court, "Congress has not infringed
any First Amendment rights or regulated any First Amendment
activity. Congress has simply chosen not to pay for [the group's]
lobbying."73 While emphasizing the government's broad discretionS 74
to create statutory classifications, the Court noted that "[t] he case
would be different if Congress were to discriminate invidiously in
67. Forbes, 523 U.S. at 683 (holding that a speaker's status is a legitimate ground for ex-
cluding speech from a nonpublic forum); Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829 ("The necessities of
confining a forum to the limited and legitimate purposes for which it was created mayjustify
the State in reserving it for certain groups or for the discussion of certain topics.").
68. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829 (noting that the state is forbidden "to exercise view-
point discrimination, even when the limited public forum is one of its own creation"); Forbes,
523 U.S. at 682 ("[T]he exclusion of a speaker from a nonpublic forum must not be based
on the speaker's viewpoint and must otherwise be reasonable in light of the purpose of the
property.").
69. Nat'l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 588 (1998) ("Congress may
,selectively fund a program to encourage certain activities it believes to be in the public
interest, without at the same time funding an alternative program which seeks to deal with
the problem in another way.'" (quoting Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 193 (1990)); Rosenber-
ger, 515 U.S. at 834 (noting that the government can give preferential treatment to certain
speakers in awarding tax benefits)).
70. 461 U.S. 540 (1983).
71. The statute denied a tax exemption to a nonprofit organization that engaged in
substantial lobbying, exempting from this exemption veterans' organizations. Id. at 543.
"Both tax exemptions and tax deductibility are a form of subsidy that is administered
through the tax system." Id. at 544.
72. Id. at 545 (quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 518 (1958) (discussing invali-
dating a rule requiring anyone who sought to take advantage of a state property tax
exemption to sign a declaration stating that he did not advocate the forcible overthrow of
The United States).
73. Id. at 546.
74. Id. at 547 (" [S] tatutory classifications are valid if they bear a rational relation to a
legitimate governmental purpose.... Legislatures have especially broad latitude in creating
classifications and distinctions in tax statutes.").
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its subsidies in such a way as to '"ai[m] at the suppression of
dangerous ideas." ' "5 But the Court found "no indication that the
statute was intended to suppress any ideas or any demonstration
that it has had that effect."76 The Court thus "reaffirmed the
requirement of viewpoint neutrality in the Government's provision
of financial benefits," but found the distinction at issue to be one
"based on preferential treatment of certain speakers-veterans'
organizations-and not a distinction based on the content or
messages of those groups' speech."77
By contrast to speaker- or topic-related assistance, the govern-
ment imposes an unconstitutional condition when it distributes
nonspeech benefits according to speakers' viewpoints. In Speiser v.
Randall,78 the Court struck down a California property tax exemp-
tion granted only to individuals who signed an oath of loyalty to
the country and the state. According to the Court, "[T] he denial of
a tax exemption for engaging in certain speech necessarily will
have the effect of coercing the claimants to refrain from the pro-
scribed speech., 79 It was invalid because it was "'frankly aimed at
the suppression of dangerous ideas.'",s Similarly, in Perry v. Sinder-81
mann, the Court confirmed that "even though a person has no
'right' to a valuable governmental benefit and even though the
government may deny him the benefit for any number of reasons,
[it may not do so] on a basis that infringes his constitutionally pro-
tected interests--especially, his interest in freedom of speech."
8 2
Most recently, the Court in Legal Services Corporation v. Velazque 3
invalidated a condition in a federal statute requiring that attorneys
funded to represent welfare benefits claimants not challenge exist-
ing law. 4 Citing Regan and Speiser, the Court reiterated that
"[w]here private speech is involved, even Congress' antecedent
funding decision cannot be aimed at the suppression of ideas
75. Id. at 548 (quoting Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 513 (1959) (quoting
Speiser, 357 U.S. at 519)).
76. Id.
77. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 834 (1995) (cit-
ing Regan, 461 U.S. at 548).
78. 357 U.S. 513 (1958).
79. Id. at 519.
80. Id. (quoting Am. Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 402 (1949)).
81. 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
82. Id. at 597.
83. 531 U.S. 533 (2001).
84. Id. at 537 ("As interpreted by the LSC and by the [g]overnment, the restriction
prevents an attorney from arguing to a court that a state statute conflicts with a federal stat-




thought inimical to the Government's own interests."' 5 Thus, as
with its administration of private speech forums, when the gov-
ernment conditions benefits to private speakers in circumstances
in which it is not "convey[ing] a governmental message, 8 6 the pro-
hibition against viewpoint discrimination applies. 7
B. Primarily Government Speech
A crucial aspect of a government/private speech interaction is
that private speakers actually do the talking; the government's in-
put comes from its selection of private speakers. When the
government's selection process constitutes speech, it can discrimi-
nate among private speakers according to their viewpoints. There
are several ways that the government can legitimately "speak"
through its selection of private speakers.
1. Government Agent--One of the ways that the government can
speak through private individuals is by designating them as its
agents."" The government can effectively designate private indi-
viduals as its agents by funding or otherwise benefitting their
speech and telling them what to say. The private speaker govern-
ment agents then speak on the government's behalf to promote its
chosen policy, which will usually advocate one viewpoint over an-
other. So, for example, the government can establish a program to
encourage people to eat less fat and require funded entities to
provide that advice only, rather than multiple views on the merits
of a low-fat diet. Because the funded entities and the individuals
employed by them with government funds are government agents
85. Id. at 548-49.
86. Id. at 541 (quoting Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S.
819, 833 (1995)).
87. Id. at 542 ("[V]iewpoint-based restrictions are [not] proper when the [govern-
ment] ... expends funds to encourage a diversity of views from private speakers....
Although the LSC program differs from the program at issue in Rosenberger in that its pur-
pose is not to 'encourage a diversity of views,' the salient point is that, like the program in
Rosenberger, the LSC program was designed to facilitate private speech, not to promote a
governmental message.").
88. See, e.g., Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 234-35
(2000) (holding that speech by the university's "agents or employees" is government
speech).
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hired to "convey a governmental message," the rules of govern-
ment speech apply.8 9
In Rust v. Sullivan," the Court upheld a government program
providing funds to family planning projects on the condition that
the grantees not use the federal funds to provide abortion counsel-
ing or referrals. 9' Petitioners claimed the government had imposed a
"viewpoint-discriminatory condition" on its subsidy.92 Although the
Court in Rust did not rely on a determination that the funded doc-
tors were government agents, subsequent decisions explained Rust's
holding in this way.99 According to the Court, the government in
Rust" 'used private speakers to transmit specific information pertain-
ing to its own program"' and so could "'take legitimate and
appropriate steps to ensure that its message [wa]s neither garbled
nor distorted by the grantee.' ,9 These steps can include discrimi-
nating among funded speakers according to their viewpoints. 9
Recently, the Velazquez Court compared the attorney speech
limitation before it with the doctor speech limitation that it upheld
in Rust.96 Crucial to its holding invalidating the attorney funding
condition was its determination that, unlike the doctors' speech in
Rust, "[t] he advice from the attorney to the client and the advocacy
by the attorney to the courts cannot be classified as governmental
speech even under a generous understanding of the concept."
97
The Court rejected the government's argument that, as in Rust, the
attorney funding condition was "necessary to define the scope and
contours of the federal program."9 According to the Court,
"Congress cannot recast a condition on funding as a mere
definition of its program in every case, lest the First Amendment
be reduced to a simple semantic exercise."9 The attorneys' speech
89. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 833 ("When the government disburses public funds to pri-
vate entities to convey a government message, it may take legitimate and appropriate steps
to ensure that its message is neither garbled nor distorted by the grantee.").
90. 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
91. Id. at 179. The restrictions at issue are contained in Title X of the Public Health
Service Act, 84 Stat. 1506, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300-300a-6 (1970).
92. Id. at 192 (quoting Br. for Pet'rs at 11).
93. E.g., Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 541 (2001) ("The Court in Rust
did not place explicit reliance on the rationale that the counseling activities of the doctors
under Title X amounted to governmental speech; when interpreting the holding in later
cases, however, we have explained Rust on this understanding.").
94. Id. (quoting Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 833).
95. Id. (noting that the government can make "viewpoint-based funding decisions" in
"instances... like Rust").
96. Id.
97. Id. at 542-43.
98. Id. at 547.
99. Id.
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was "constitutionally protected expression"'00 that the government
sought to "regulate"' ' without a "programmatic message of the
kind recognized in Rust and which sufficed there to allow the
Government to specify the advice deemed necessary for its
legitimate objectives."0 2 Because of this "vital" difference from Rust
'°-that "private speech [wa]s involved" 4 -the rule forbidding
viewpoint discrimination in funding applied. The funding
condition, which excluded "certain vital theories and ideas" from
the scope of litigation,' 5 unconstitutionally "distort[ed]" the "usual
functioning" of the judicial system 0 6 and so was invalid.' 7
100. Id. at 548.
101. Id. at 543 (noting "the extent of LSC's regulation of private expression").
102. Id. at 548.
103. Id.
104. Id. ("Where private speech is involved, even Congress' antecedent funding deci-
sion cannot be aimed at the suppression of ideas thought inimical to the Government's own
interest.").
105. Id.
106. Id. at 555.
107. The Court also distinguished the Velazquez condition from the condition in Rust on
the ground that "there is no alternative channel for the expression of the advocacy Congress
seeks to restrict." Id. at 546-47. "This is in stark contrast to Rust. There, a patient could re-
ceive the approved Title X family planning counseling funded by the Government and later
could consult an affiliate or independent organization to receive abortion counseling....
Because LSC attorneys must withdraw whenever a question of a welfare statute's validity
arises, an individual could not obtain joint representation so that the constitutional chal-
lenge would be presented by a non-LSC attorney, and other, permitted, arguments advanced
by LSC counsel." Id. at 547.
The four Velazquez dissenters, led by Justice Scalia, found the Court's effort to distinguish
the types of speech at issue in Velazquez and Rust "so unpersuasive it hardly needs response."
Id. at 554 (Scalia, J., dissenting). In both cases, the government limited the advice that pro-
fessionals could give in confidential conversations with their clients. Id. ("If the private
doctors' confidential advice to their patients at issue in Rust constituted 'government
speech,' it is hard to imagine what subsidized speech would not be government speech.")
(emphasis in the original). According to the dissent, the speech in both instances was pri-
vate. Id. ("Even respondents agree that 'the true speaker in Rust was not the government,
but a doctor.'" (quoting Br. for Resp'ts at 19 n.17)). Nevertheless, the dissent would have
upheld both limitations because they occurred as part of "a federal subsidy program, not a
federal regulatory program," where the rules that control the government's discretion are
fundamentally different. Id. at 552 ("Regulations directly restrict speech; subsidies do not.").
The dissent would apply a higher threshold for labeling a government choice viewpoint
discriminatory in the former instance, finding subsidies invalid only when they are
"'manipulated' to have a 'coercive effect' on those who do not hold the subsidized posi-
tion." Id. (quoting Nat'l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 587 (1998) (quoting
Ark. Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 237 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting))).
According to the dissent, "proving coercion" in the context of a "limited spending program"
such as those at issue in Rust and Velazquez "is virtually impossible, because simply denying a
subsidy 'does not "coerce" belief.'" Id. (quoting Lyng v. Auto. Workers, 485 U.S. 360, 369
(1988)); see also id. at 552-53. ("[T]he criterion of unconstitutionality [in the context of
limited spending programs] is whether denial of the subsidy threatens 'to drive certain ideas
or viewpoints from the marketplace.'" (quoting Finley, 524 U.S. at 587)). So, in this instance,
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These two 5-4 decisions 8 thus establish a fine line that makes
all the difference with respect to the constitutionality of govern-
ment funding of private speakers. On one side of the line are
government "agents" who deliver a government message. 1°9 The
government can control the viewpoint expressed by its agents to
ensure that its message is "neither garbled nor distorted.""1 On the
other side of the line are private speakers whom the government
"facilitate [s]" without sending its own message."' In this category,
viewpoint control by the government over the private speakers'
messages is forbidden. 2 In this context, it is the private speakers'
messages that are protected from penalty
3 or distortion.'1
2. Government Editors-Another instance of government speech
occurs when a government entity acts as an editor, compiling nu-
merous private messages into a unique presentation. Unlike the
situation of private speaker "agents," the private speakers chosen
by government editors do not each deliver a "programmatic mes-
sage. "" 5 Rather, where a government entity selects and presents
private speakers in a way that is reasonably perceived by listeners to
send a message,' 16 the combined result of the selection process, as
the attorney funding condition was not viewpoint discriminatory according to the definition
advocated by the dissent. Id. at 553 (noting that selective funding in Rust "was not.., the
type of 'discriminat[ion] on the basis of viewpoint' that triggers strict scrutiny" and "[t]he
same is true here." (quoting Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 193 (1991))). Rather, "[t]he pro-
vision simply declines to subsidize a certain class of litigation, and under Rust that decision
does not infringe the right to bring such litigation." Id. at 553-54.
108. The Rust majority consisted of Justices Rehnquist, White, Scalia, Kennedy and
Souter. The dissenters were Justices Blackmun, Marshall, Stevens and O'Connor. 500 U.S. at
176. The Velazquez majority consisted of Justices Kennedy, Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and
Breyer. The dissenters were Justices Scalia, Rehnquist, O'Connor and Thomas. 531 U.S. at
535.
109. See Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 541 ("[Government may] use[] private speakers to trans-
mit specific information pertaining to its own program.") (quoting Rosenberger v. Rector &
Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995)).
110. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 833.
111. Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 542.
112. Id. ("[V]iewpoint-based restrictions are [not] proper [in every instance where the
government subsidizes speech]," including where the government "facilitate[s] private
speech [and does] not promote a government message.").
113. See Regan v. Taxation With Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 545 (1983)
("[t]o deny an exemption to claimants who engage in certain forms of speech is in effect to
penalize them for such speech." (quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 518 (1958))).
114. See Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 544 ("Restricting LSC attorneys in advising their clients
and in presenting arguments and analyses to the courts distorts the legal system by altering
the traditional role of the attorneys.").
115. Id.at548.
116. See Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group, Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 568
(1995) (holding that parades are forms of expression when defined as "marchers who are




an exercise of journalistic discretion, constitutes a "speech act" to
which the protections of governmental speech apply."' That the
selection process is protected as government speech means that
government editors can generally discriminate according to
viewpoint in selecting private speakers to include in their publica-
tions. " s
In Arkansas Educational Television Commission v. Forbes,"" the Court
likened public broadcasters to private broadcasters in finding that
public broadcasters generally may claim the protection of govern-
ment speech. Although the Court acknowledged that public
broadcasters "can and do abuse [their discretion to choose among
private speakers to present in their programming]," it emphasized
that "'[c]alculated risks of abuse are taken in order to preserve
higher values.' ,20 These "higher values" include preserving the
ability of public broadcasters to exercise "editorial discretion" in a
way that "communicate [s] messages" for which the broadcasters
are "accountable" to the government entities that create them and
license their activities."2' A public broadcaster thus enjoys the dis-
cretion of a government speaker in selecting and presenting its
programming. 1
2
Similarly, other government entities may claim the protection of
government speech when selecting and compiling private speech
in a way that sends a governmental message. The Court's examples
of other government editors include "a university selecting a com-
mencement speaker, a public institution selecting speakers for a
lecture series, or a public school prescribing its curriculum.' ' 123 In
all of these instances, the government entity's selection process is
its effort to craft its own expression. Because the government's
unique compilation of private speakers is a valuable addition to the
speech market, the protection of government speech applies.
117. See Ark. Educ. Television Comm'n v, Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 674 (1998) ("When a
public broadcaster exercises editorial discretion in the selection and presentation of its
programming, it engages in speech activity."); Hurley, 515 U.S. at 570 ("The selection of
contingents to make a parade is entitled to [First Amendment] protection.").
118. See Forbes, 523 U.S. at 674 ("Much like a university selecting a commencement
speaker, a public institution selecting speakers for a lecture series, or a public school pre-
scribing its curriculum, a broadcaster by its nature will facilitate the expression of some
viewpoints instead of others.").
119. 523 U.S. 666 (1998).
120. Id. at 674 (quoting Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S.
94, 125 (1973)).
121. Id.
122. Id. at 673 ("As a general rule, the nature of editorial discretion counsels against
subjecting broadcasters to claims of viewpoint discrimination.").
123. Id. at 674.
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In some instances, however, an entity that can be a government
editor loses the discretion that it would otherwise have to discrimi-
nate among private speakers according to their viewpoints. 12 4 This
occurs when the circumstances of the particular presentation indi-
cate that, rather than sending its own message, the government
editor is creating a private speech forum. Specifically, a public
broadcaster does not enjoy the protection of a government speaker
when it selects the participants in a particular candidate debate. A
candidate debate is a private speech forum for several reasons, in-
cluding its design. 125 Related to its design is "the long tradition of
candidate debates," which creates "the implicit representation"
that the selection decisions are not based upon the candidates'
messages. 2 6 The other reason is that "candidate debates are of
exceptional significance in the electoral process.' 27 These consid-
erations mean that "[v]iewpoint discrimination in this context
would present not a 'calculated risk,' but an inevitability of skewing
the electoral dialogue.",
2 8
Although Forbes deals with public broadcasters, who exercise the
"'widest journalistic freedom"' to choose among private speak-
ers,' 2 9 the line it draws applies as well to government editors who
operate under narrower mandates. 13 A government editor's exer-
cise of discretion in choosing private speakers has constitutional
value because the government editor sends its own message
through its selection of private speakers. The value does not attach
when, through its choices of private speakers, the government edi-
tor itself is no longer "speaking."
3. Government Quality Arbiter-Another instance in which the
government's selection of private speakers is government speech
occurs when the government administers a competitive benefit
124. Id. at 675 ("Although public broadcasting as a general matter does not lend itself





128. Id. at 676 (quoting Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S.
94, 125 (1973)).
129. Id. at 673 ("[T]elevision broadcasters enjoy the 'widest journalistic freedom' con-
sistent with their public responsibilities." (quoting Columbia Broad. Sys., 412 U.S. at 110)).
130. Public broadcasters are charged generally with "schedul[ing] programming that
serves the 'public interest, convenience, and necessity.'" Id. (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 309(a)).
Government editors may be charged with serving the needs of a more narrow audience than
the public generally, for example, property owners, taxpayers, or aliens. They may also be
charged with compiling private speakers to address a particular topic, such as how to deal
with drug addiction or domestic abuse. Government editors then exercise discretion within
the scope of their mandates.
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program designed to reward high quality private expression.' 3' The
private speakers selected by a government quality arbiter are not
government agents because their particular messages do not advo-
cate a government policy. Nor do these private speakers "speak" for
the government by sending one part of a greater whole that consti-
tutes a government editor's expression. Rather, speakers chosen by
a government quality arbiter each send a message which, when
combined with the government's quality endorsement, communi-
cates the government's view of what constitutes quality expression
as set out in the guidelines of the particular program.
This programmatic goal of selecting and rewarding "quality" ex-
pression is valuable for the same reasons as speech furthering
other government policy goals. With such a program, the rule that
grants "Congress ... wide latitude to set spending priorities" ap-
plies. 32 The use of viewpoint discriminatory selection criteria is not
"invidious"3 3 because the government "has merely chosen to fund
one activity to the exclusion of the other.'
3 4
So, in National Endowmentfor the Arts v. Finley, 35 the Court upheld
Congress's mandate that the NEA "tak[e] into consideration gen-
eral standards of decency and respect for the diverse beliefs and
values of the American public" when distributing arts funding.
3 6
Although the Court did not explicitly label the challenged criteria
viewpoint discriminatory 37 or label the NEA's speech selection
judgments government speech, it granted the NEA the discretion
of a government speaker to employ "criteria that would be imper-
missible were direct regulation of speech or a criminal penalty at
stake." 
3
The Court in Finley compared the NEA's funding decisions with
other government/private speech interactions that constitute pri-
vate speech forums in which the government cannot discriminate
according to viewpoint. In Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the
131. See Nat'l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 587-88 (1998) ("[T]he
Government may allocate competitive funding according to criteria that would be imper-
missible were direct regulation of speech or a criminal penalty at stake.").
132. Id. at 588.
133. Id. at 587 (contrasting statutory criteria with denial of a grant, which "may be
shown to be the product of invidious viewpoint discrimination").
134. Id. at 588.
135. Id. at 569.
136. Id. at 590 (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 954(d) (1) (1994)).
137. Id. at 605 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("IT]he considerations that the provision intro-
duces, by their nature, do not engender the kind of directed viewpoint discrimination that
would prompt this Court to invalidate a statute on its face.").
138. Id. at 587-88.
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University of Virginia,139 a public university created a student activi-
ties fund to finance the printing of student publications "related to
[its] educational purpose." 40 It then declined to fund a Christian
student newspaper. The Court found that the university's purpose
was to "encourage a diversity of views from private speakers," which
meant that it had created a private speech forum. 4' Excising cer-
tain speakers because of their viewpoint threatened to "skew"
public dialogue in "multiple ways.,1
4 2
By contrast, it was "the competitive process according to which
the grants [we]re allocated" that distinguished the NEA grants
from those in Rosenberger and other "comparably objective deci-
sions on allocating public benefits." 43 That the NEA must make
"esthetic judgments" about which private speakers meet "the in-
herently content-based 'excellence' threshold for ... support"
44
makes "absolute neutrality ... simply 'inconceivable' [for the
NEA.] " 4,5 In creating the NEA, Congress's purpose was to devote
public funds to promote "excellent" expression, as defined by
Congress and by the various bodies that analyze grant applica-• 146
tions. For the NEA to fulfill its mandate to select and promote
"excellent" expression, believed by Congress to be "in the public
interest," 147 tolerating some "risk" of viewpoint discrimination is
constitutionally appropriate.
48
The Court's decisions in Finley, Forbes, and the other forum cases
thus create another fine line between government/private speech
interactions that constitute government speech and those that
139. 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
140. Id. at 824 (quoting App. to Pet. for Cert. at 61a).
141. Id. at 834.
142. Id. at 832.
143. Finley, 524 U.S. at 586 (citing Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist.,
508 U.S. 384, 386 (1993) (school auditorium), Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad,
420 U.S. 546, 555 (1975) (municipal theater), and Hannegan v. Esquire, Inc., 327 U.S. 146,
148 n.1 (1946) (second class mailing privileges)).
144. Id. at 586.
145. Id. at 585-86 (quoting Advocates for the Arts v. Thomson, 532 E2d 792, 795-96
(st Cir. 1976)).
146. Id. at 587.
147. Id. at 588 ("Congress may 'selectively fund a program to encourage certain activi-
ties it believes to be in the public interest, without at the same time funding an alternative
program which seeks to deal with the problem in another way."' (quoting Rust v. Sullivan,
500 U.S. 173, 193 (1991))).
148. Id. at 583-84 ("Respondents' claim that the provision is facially unconstitutional
may be reduced to the argument that the criteria ... are sufficiently subjective that the
agency could utilize them to engage in viewpoint discrimination. Given the varied interpre-
tations of the criteria and the vague exhortation to 'take them into consideration,' it seems
unlikely that this provision will introduce any greater element of selectivity than the deter-
mination of 'artistic excellence' itself.").
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facilitate private expression. The government creates a private
speech forum when it "encourage[s] a diversity of views from
private speakers"' 49 or when it "reserve[s] eligibility for access to
the forum to a particular class of speakers, whose members must
then, as individuals, 'obtain permission' to use it."' 5 In either case,
it cannot discriminate according to viewpoint among the private
speakers. When the government employs a "competitive process,""'
however, through which it selects and promotes quality expression,
its access criteria can be "imprecise" and "subjective"' 15 in a way that
may well incorporate viewpoint-based considerations.
II. DISTINGUISHING PRIVATE SPEECH ASSISTANCE THAT
Is GOVERNMENT SPEECH FROM THAT
WHICH REMAINS PRIVATE
Although constitutional doctrine depends upon the distinction
between government/private speech interactions that constitute
government speech and those where the speech remains funda-
mentally private,153 it does not sufficiently clarify how to distinguish
the two. The uncertainty centers on the distinction between in-
stances where the government can make viewpoint-based choices
among the private speakers it assists and those where it cannot be-
cause it administers a nonpublic forum 5 4 or otherwise "facilitate [s]
private speech" without itself speaking.' 55
Viewpoint discrimination by the government among private
speakers is a highly dangerous activity. It can be justified only by the
countervailing free speech value that occurs because the viewpoint
discrimination is essential to valuable government expression.
Protection against such viewpoint discrimination is at the core of the
free speech guarantee, and the government structures and
149. Id. at 586 (quoting Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S.
819,834 (1995)).
150. Ark. Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 679 (1998) (quoting Corne-
lius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 804 (1985)).
151. Finley, 524 U.S. at 586.
152. Id. at 590.
153. See, e.g., Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 235
(2000) ("Where the [government] speaks .... the analysis likely would be altogether differ-
ent [than when the government funds private speakers.]").
154. "[T]he inherently content-based 'excellence' threshold for NEA support sets it
apart from... subsid [ies]," Finley, 524 U.S. at 571, that "encourage a diversity of views from
private speakers", Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 834.
155. Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 542 (2001).
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administers government/private speech interactions. This suggests
that it bear the burden to do so in a way that demonstrates that
through its private speech selections it is talking legitimately.
The focus of the constitutional inquiry, then, must be on the
characteristics that render government speech legitimate and
whether they are present in a particular government/private
speech interaction. The Court's discussion of government speech,
as well as the values that underpin it, provide clues as to the char-
acteristics that render government speech legitimate. These




identifiable message,' 57 and non-speech-suppressing impact.
5 8
A. Accountability for Speaking
The recent cases emphasize that accountability for speaking is a
crucial element of legitimate government speech.' 9 Government
speech is legitimate when it adds the collective voice of the people,
through their elected government, to the marketplace of ideas.'6 A
primary danger of government speech, however, is that it will in-
doctrinate rather than inform.' 6' The source of any speech in the
marketplace of ideas is important information that adds to its mes-
sage and allows the citizenry that hears it to better evaluate its
worth,' 62 rendering their choices self-conscious rather than the
product of indoctrination. While the interest of private individuals
in speaking anonymously may outweigh listeners' interest in know-
ing who they are, this same balance does not apply when the
156. See, e.g., Southworth, 529 U.S. at 235 (noting that government may speak because it
is "accountable").
157. See Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 548 (noting that funding is not government speech if it
lacks a "programmatic message").
158. See Nat'l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 571 (1998) (noting that
elective funding is valid because it does not "raise[] concern about the suppression of
disfavored viewpoints"). See generally Randall P. Bezanson & William G. Buss, The Many Faces
of Government Speech, 86 IOwA L. REv. 1377, 1511 (2001) (analyzing eight case studies of
government speech and drawing some similar limits from them).
159. See, e.g., Southworth, 529 U.S. at 235 (noting that when government speaks, it is "ac-
countable"); Ark. Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 675 (1998) (noting that
broadcasters are "accountable" for their exercise of editorial discretion).
160. See Southworth, 529 U.S. at 229 ("The government, as a general rule, may support
valid programs and policies by taxes or other exactions binding on protesting parties.
Within this broader principle it seems inevitable that funds raised by the government will be
spent for speech and other expression to advocate and defend its own policies.").
161. SeeYUDOF, supra note 2, at 15.
162. See City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 56 (1994) ("[TIhe identity of the speaker is
an important component of many attempts to persuade.").
[VOL. 36:1
Who's 7hlking?
government speaks. 16 3 If the government can hide the fact that it is
influencing the ability of private speakers to speak and their mes-
sages when they do so, it can skew the speech market and the basis
of its political support in unaccountable ways.'6 Thus, accountabil-
ity depends most fundamentally upon the government adequately
informing the citizenry of the fact that it is speaking when it en-
gages in a government/private speech interaction.
In addition, to be the voice of the people, the government must
acknowledge that it is speaking for the people in a publicly visible
165way, so that it is politically accountable for what it chooses to say.
Accountability depends upon the citizenry being able to evaluate
the content of the government's speech and to influence its con-
tent by communicating with the responsible government officials
or by electing new officials who can "espouse some different or
contrary position."'6 So, for government speech to be legitimate,
the government must both adequately inform the citizenry of the
fact that it is speaking through private speakers and provide the
content of its expression when it does so.
The question then becomes what the government must do to
adequately inform the citizenry. Here, because Free Speech Clause
values are at stake, it becomes necessary to distinguish between
general accountability to the citizenry at large and more specific
accountability to the citizens particularly affected by the communi-
cation.
1. General Accountability-The government meets the
requirement of general accountability by authorizing the
government/private speech interaction in a legitimate and publicly
visible political process.167 The government must make clear
through this process that it intends to speak through private
speakers, how it intends to do so, and what it intends to say.
163. See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 357 (1995) ("Anonymity is a
shield from the tyranny of the majority.").
164. See Cole, supra note 2, at 705 ("The problem with both [government speech sup-
pression and selective support of private speech] is their skewing effect on public debate.");
Abner S. Greene, Government of the Good, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1, 49 (2000) ("[C]lear identifica-
tion of speech as the government's enhances accountability by permitting the citizens to
know that position the government has taken and to reject them, if necessary, at election
time.").
165. See Southworth, 529 U.S. at 235 ("When the government speaks, for instance to
promote its own policies or to advance a particular idea, it is, in the end, accountable to the
electorate and the political process for its advocacy.").
166. Id.; see unoF, supra note 2, at 22 ("The preservation of democracy... requires a
balance between communications from government and those addressed to it.").
167. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 168 (1992) (noting that accountability re-
quires that officials "make[] the decision in full view of the public").
FAIL2002]
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
In most cases, the government will meet the requirement of
general accountability. In the instance of government agency, the
government can meet the requirement of general accountability by
stating clearly the boundaries of the program and the agents em-
ployed by it in a validly enacted piece of legislation or similar
government action. In Rust, for example, the government was gen-
erally accountable for the speech of the doctors because they were
employed by a program with boundaries that were stated clearly
and enacted legitimately through the political process. 68 These
boundaries were additionally embodied in publicly visible regula-
tions that further specified the content of the communication, who
would be delivering it, and that it was the government directing
the delivery. These circumstances mean that the government in
Rust adequately informed the general public of its intent to speak
through the private doctor "agents" employed by the program.
Similarly, in Forbes, which dealt with the category of government
editors, the programming decisions of public broadcasters were
government speech because their discretion was established by
statute and rendered them "accountable for broadcast perform-
ance.""7 By contrast to government agents, the message of their
speech cannot be stated with precision.' 7' Rather, it is their editorial
discretion that is specified by statute and supported by a "public
trust" mandate within a medium where their selection of private
speakers is customarily and reasonably viewed as a whole. 72 The
government is thus accountable, through a chain of administrative
168. See Rust . Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 178, 180 (1991) (noting that a congressional stat-
ute providing that "[no funds] shall be used in programs where abortion is a method of
family planning" authorizes the Secretary of Health and Human Services to make grants and
to promulgate regulations tinder the Act, and noting that the Secretary's regulation prohib-
ited abortion counseling and referral).
169. Id. at 179-80 ("[T]he regulations specify that a 'Title X project may not provide
counseling concerning the use of abortion as a method of family planning or provide refer-
ral for abortion as a method of family planning.' ... The Title X project is expressly
prohibited from referring a pregnant woman to an abortion provider, even upon specific
request. One permissible response to such an inquiry is that 'the project does not consider
abortion an appropriate method of family planning and therefore does not counsel or refer
for abortion."' (quoting 42 C.ER. § 59.8(a) (1), (b) (5) (1989))).
170. 523 U.S. 666, 675. (1998).
171. Cf Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group, 515 U.S. 557, 569
(1995) ("[A] narrow, succinctly articulable message is not a condition of constitutional pro-
tection.").
172. Forbes, 523 U.S. at 675 (holding that public broadcasters engage in "public trustee"
broadcasting (quoting Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94,
125 (1973))).
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So, too, the NEA's "mandate ... to make esthetic judgments"
and "the inherently content-based 'excellence' threshold for NEA
support," 7' both established by statute, 75 rendered the government
accountable for the "quality-based" speech selection judgments in
Finley.7 6 Not only was the government accountable for the "excel-
lence" threshold, but also for the more specific "decency and
respect" 77 consideration contained in the statute. The government
made clear its intent to choose and assist private artists, as well as
its criteria for doing so, and subjected both to the political proc-178
ess. The government was therefore generally accountable for the
NEA's speech selection judgments.
But the government has been accountable in this general way
not only in cases where the Court found it to be effectively speak-
ing, but also in cases where the Court invalidated the government's
attempt to restrict private speakers. For example, the attorney
speech restriction in Velazquez was a publicly visible product of the
political process,'7" as presumably were the university guidelines at
issue in Rosenberger.18° In most forum cases, the government meets
the requirement of general accountability by appropriately estab-
lishing and publicizing its selective access standards,'" justifying its
173. Id. at 673-74 (holding that the government, by federal statute, imposes on broad-
casters a "duty to schedule programming that serves the 'public interest, convenience, and
necessity.'" (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 309(a))).
174. Nat'l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 586 (1998).
175. Id. at 573 (citing 20 U.S.C. §§ 954(c) (1)-(10) (1994)).
176. Id. at 586 (noting that reliance on the forum precedents to decide NEA funding
challenge is "misplaced").
177. Id. at 576. The provision was "a bipartisan compromise between Members oppos-
ing any funding restrictions and those favoring some guidance to the agency." Id.
178. Id. (detailing congressional consideration and debate of the disputed funding cri-
teria).
179. Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 538 (2001) ("The restrictions at issue
were part of a compromise set of restrictions enacted in the Omnibus Consolidated Rescis-
sions And Appropriations Act of 1996 .. ., § 504, 110 Stat. 1321-53, and continued in each
subsequent annual appropriations Act.").
180. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 825 (1995) (not-
ing that university guidelines prohibited student activity fund support of "religious
activities").
181. See, for example, Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 265 (1981), in which the Univer-
sity Board of Curators adopted a regulation prohibiting the use of University buildings or
grounds "for purposes of religious worship or religious teaching." See also Lamb's Chapel v.
Ctr. Moriches Union Free School District, 508 U.S. 384 (1993), in which the state court inter-
preted a New York statute authorizing local school boards to adopt regulations with respect
to use of school property as not allowing boards discretion to allow religious uses. Id. at 386.
The school board had adopted a rule prohibiting religious uses. Id.
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selectivity on the grounds that it is or likely will be perceived as
speaking through the private speakers.1 2 The question then is not
one of general accountability, but whether the access standard, for
which the government is generally accountable, otherwise violates
the Constitution."3 Thus, where is exists, the fact of general ac-
countability cannot, alone, be conclusive.
The instances where general accountability is conclusive are not
where it is present, but rather where it is lacking. One such in-
stance is where the government expressly "disclaim[s] that the
speech is its own." 18 4 In such a case, it is not necessary to "reach the
question" whether the government's actions are permissible "un-
der the principle that the government can speak for itself.""'5
Another such instance is where a policy, for which the government
is generally accountable, is enforced inconsistently by administra-
tive officials. Courts have looked to the policy and practice of the
government to determine whether it has created a private speech
forum.1 16 Where the two diverge, the government cannot rely on
the policy as a valid basis for discriminating against a particular
private speaker.8 7 Analogously, when the government claims that a
legitimately enacted and visible policy renders it generally ac-
countable for "speaking" through private speakers, this should be
true only where the policy is reasonably clear and consistently ap-
plied by the government officials responsible for administering it.""8
182. See Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 385 (finding, in response to the school district's ar-
gument, that "there would be no realistic danger that the community would think that the
District was endorsing religion or any particular creed"); Widmar, 454 U.S. at 274 ("[A]n
open forum in a public university does not confer any imprimatur of state approval on reli-
gious sects or practices.").
183. See Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 393 (holding that the question is not whether the dis-
trict complied with its stated policy of excluding all religious uses, but whether the policy
unconstitutionally "discriminates on the basis of viewpoint"); Widmar, 454 U.S. at 267
("Through its policy of accommodating their meetings, the University has created a forum
generally open for use by student groups. Having done so, the University has assumed an
obligation to justify its discriminations and exclusions under applicable constitutional
norms.").
184. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. ofWis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 229 (2000).
185. Id.
186. See e.g., AIDS Action Comm. v. Mass. Bay Transp. Auth., 42 F3d 1, 10 (lst Cir. 1994)
(holding that the government's policy of prohibiting sexually explicit advertisements is not
consistent with its practice of allowing some that meet the definition but not others);
Christ's Bride Ministries, Inc. v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth., 148 E3d 242, 251-52 (3d
Cir. 1998) (same).
187. SeeAir Line Pilots Ass'n Int'l v. Dep't of Aviation, 45 F.3d 1144, 1153 (7th Cir. 1995)
("This factual inquiry into consistent policy and practice is necessary ... because it ....
guards against the dangers of post-hoc policy formulation or the discretionary enforcement
of an effectively inoperative policy.").
188. The degree of discretion the government can legitimately delegate to those re-
sponsible for selecting the private speakers to be government speakers will depend upon the
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2. Specific Accountability-Because Free Speech Clause values are
at stake, the accountability that supports government speech must
have an additional aspect. General public accountability addresses
the constitutional interest of the citizenry in shaping the govern-
ment's decision to speak through private persons and its message
when it does so. It does not, however, effectively protect against the
danger of speech market skewing that occurs because of the rea-
sonable perceptions of individuals particularly affected by the
government/private speech interaction. 8 9 So, in addition to being
accountable to the public generally for its effort to influence the
speech market, the government must be accountable to listeners
who will be particularly affected by the communication.' 9° Specifi-
cally, where government speech is aimed at a targeted group of
listeners, the government must make them reasonably aware, in a
way beyond the general awareness of government processes and
enactments, of the source of the communication and its content.'91
The Court's treatment of government/private speech interactions
indicates a concern with listeners' reasonable perceptions of the
source of the speech they receive. In Forbes, the Court relied upon
this to distinguish a broadcaster's programming decisions, which are
government speech, from its choice of candidates to participate in
a candidate debate. 92 Specifically, the "long tradition of candidate
debates" supported the broadcaster's "implicit representation" in
creating one that "the views expressed were those of the
type of government speech at issue. Where the element of government speech is the selec-
tion process rather than the message of any particular speaker, broad discretion will be
appropriate. See Ark. Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 673 (1998)
("[Broadcasters] must exercise [discretion] to fulfill their journalistic purpose and statutory
obligations."); Nat'l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 589 (1997) ("In the
context of selective subsidies, it is not always feasible for Congress to legislate with clarity.").
In contrast, where the private speaker is a government agent, less discretion will be appro-
priate.
189. See Cole, supra note 2, at 680 (noting that "[t]he unconstitutional conditions doc-
trine does not address ... audience-based [F] irst [A] mendment concerns" and arguing that
"another doctrinal approach is needed").
190. Cf Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 779 (1995)
(O'Connor, J., concurring) (arguing that the endorsement inquiry under the Establishment
Clause should look to "'the "objective" meaning of the [government's] statement in the
community"' (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 690 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concur-
ing))).
191. Id. at 776 (O'ConnorJ., concurring) ("To the plurality's consideration of the open
nature of the forum and the private ownership of the display, however, I would add the
presence of a sign disclaiming government sponsorship or endorsement on the Klan cross,
which would make the State's role clear to the community.").
192. 523 U.S. at 675. The Court also relied upon the "exceptional significance" of can-
didate debates in the electoral process. Id.
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candidates, not its own. "' In Velazquez, the Court found the funded
attorney restriction to distort the usual functioning of the judicial
process, where both clients and judges act under the "'assumption
that [a private claimant's] counsel will be free of state control.' ,194
By contrast, in finding doctors' speech to be government speech in
Rust, the Court rejected the claim that the funding provision
"significantly impinge[d] upon the doctor-patient relationship."095
It looked to the structure of the program to conclude that it was
not "sufficiently all encompassing so as to justify an expectation on
the part of the patient of comprehensive medical advice.' 96
These cases confirm that accountability to the specific listener
for the fact that the government is speaking through private speak-
ers is an important element in establishing the legitimacy of
government speech. Where they differ is in the degree of burden
they put upon the government to make clear to individual listeners
the influence it exerts on private speakers. Forbes and Velazquez im-
ply that the government must specifically counteract listeners'
assumptions about the government's role with respect to the pri-
vate speaker,"'v whereas Rust presumes that the statutory structure
of the program determines listener expectations. 98 Because
Velazquez deals in part with perceptions ofjudges, whose profession
requires them to understand the law, and Rust deals with indigent
patients, who probably do not have this expertise, the lesser bur-
den on the government to make clear its role in shaping speech in
the latter instance is notjustified.
The Court in Velazquez was concerned with the speech market
"distortion" that occurs when the government limits the traditional
and expected scope of a professional's advice and representation
193. Id.
194. Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 542 (2001) (quoting Polk County v.
Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 322 (1981)).
195. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 200 (1991).
196. Id.
197. In Forbes, the Court implied that a broadcaster could "design" a presentation of
candidates to make clear that the government was talking by presenting them as part of a
"political talk show," for example. 523 U.S. at 675. In Velazquez, the Court did not focus on
ways that the government could counteract the impression that attorneys' speech is private
since it viewed the funding condition as unconstitutional even with such a disclosure. 531
U.S. at 549 (focusing on the fact that government "aimed at the suppression of ideas
thought inimical to the Government's own interest").
198. 500 U.S. at 200 ("The program does not provide postconception medical care, and
therefore a doctor's silence with regard to abortion cannot reasonably be thought to mislead




to serve a client's interests.""" This type of "distortion" would appear
to be present in Rust as much as in Velazquez. "0° Although Rust
arguably goes too far in labeling private speech governmental, 2 0 ' it
does not go far enough in requiring the government to take
affirmative steps to inform individual listeners that the doctors'
speech was its own. Relying on general statutory authorization
should not be enough to establish the specific accountability of a
government speaker. Rather, the government should be required
to make clear to individual listeners that it is influencing the
202private speakers' message.
While the requirement of specific accountability applies to all
instances of government speech, the extent of the government's
efforts will vary according to the context. The affirmative burden
of disclosure will be highest where the government designates
private speech agents, because the context of the speech often will
not alone make clear the fact of the government's influence. So,
for example, when a patient entering a family planning clinic to
speak to a doctor would reasonably expect to receive a private
doctor's unfettered professional judgment about family planning
alternatives, the government should have to make clear to the
patient that the doctor is a government agent delivering the
government's message. Because the government is speaking
through a private citizen's words, and a listener's general
assumption will be that such speech is private, silence by the
doctor, or disclosure at the option of the doctor, should not be
204enough. In the case of agency, the government should be
199. 531 U.S. at 546 ("In cases where LSC counsel were attorneys of record, there
would be lingering doubt whether the truncated representation had resulted in complete
analysis of the case, full advice to the client, and proper presentation to the court.").
200. Id. at 554 (ScaliaJ., dissenting) ("[T]he majority's contention that the subsidized
speech in these cases is not government speech because the lawyers have a professional
obligation to represent the interests of their clients founders on the reality that the doctors
in Rust had a professional obligation to serve the interests of their patients ....").
201. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Even respondents agree that 'the true speaker in Rust
was not the government, but a doctor."' (quoting Br. for Resp'ts at 19 n.17)).
202. Cf Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 777 (1995)
(O'Connor, J., concurring) ("[The Establishment Clause] imposes affirmative obligations
that may require a State, in some situations, to take steps to avoid being perceived as sup-
porting or endorsing a private religious message.").
203. See Rustv. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 211-12 n.3 (1991) (Blackmun,J., dissenting) ("A
woman seeking the services of a Title X clinic has every reason to expect, as do we all, that
her physician will not withhold relevant information regarding the very purpose of her
visit.").
204. See id. at 200 (noting that doctors can inform patients "that advice regarding abor-
tion is simply beyond the scope of the program.").
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required to affirmatively disclose the relationship to listeners who
interact with the government's funded speaker.
In addition, the message of a government agent should be clear,
with the burden of explicit disclosure also depending upon rea-
sonable listener assumptions in the particular context. While
attempting to persuade through omission is a common, and per-
haps effective, form of private advocacy, the government should
bear a higher burden to disclose its persuasive purpose when it
uses private agents to persuade other private citizens. So, if the
government's message is that it "favor[s] childbirth over abor-
tion"2 0 5 and so "'does not consider abortion an appropriate
method of family planning,' , 206 simply failing to mention the pos-
sibility of abortion is not sufficient to inform a family planning
clinic patient. To be legitimate government speech, the govern-
ment must require its private agents to disclose the content and
the fact that they are speaking a government message.
The disclosure burden on the government will generally be less
in the instances of government speech where the "speech" consists
of the private speech selection judgments of a government entity.
The reasonable perceptions of listeners stem from the tradition of
the type of speech opportunity and the actual administration of
the speech opportunity at issue. 2 7 So, where the government acts as
an editor, publicizing the expression of private individuals, identi-
fication of the publicist as a government actor should be sufficient
to inform listeners that the government is responsible for the
choices. Where the government speaks by selecting and promoting
"excellent" expression, identification of the expression, when and
where it occurs, as funded by a government grant with that pur-
pose, will inform individual listeners of the government's role.
Additionally, because the government's "speech" in the instances
of a government editor and a government quality arbiter is the se-
lection process rather than the message conveyed by each private
205. Id. at 192-93 ("[T]he government may 'make a value judgment favoring childbirth
over abortion, and ... implement that judgment by the allocation of public funds.'" (quot-
ing Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 474 (1977))).
206. Id. at 180 (noting that regulations provide this as one permissible response to a re-
quest by a pregnant woman for referral to an abortion provider (quoting 42 C.F.R.
§ 59.8(b) (5) (1994))).
207. See Pinette, 515 U.S. at 766 ("Capitol Square is a genuinely public forum, is known
to be a public forum, and has been widely used as a public forum for many, many years.");
id. at 780 ("[Tjhe reasonable observer in the endorsement inquiry must be deemed aware





speaker, the required disclosure as to the specific content of the
government's message will generally be less than in the context of
government agents as well. First, beyond acknowledging the me-
chanics of the selection process, it may be difficult to identify the
government's message more specifically. With editors, the compila-
tion will generally speak for itself.2 ° With quality arbiters, the
message will be that the government believes that the chosen
speech is "better" than the rest, according to the published selec-
tion standards of the program, which may not be distillable into a
210more specific message.
Second, the audience's background understanding of the sub-
jectivity of the selection process will usually make further
affirmative disclosure of the government's influence unnecessary.
Editors speak to some sort of broad population that can generally
be expected to know that content-based choices must be made in
compiling the expression. Although editors may persuade through
their inclusions and omissions, this result against a listener's rea-
sonable knowledge of their broad discretion cannot be said to
"skew" 'the listener's judgment. So too with government quality
judgments that are generally understood to be subjective. The au-
dience is on notice because of the nature of the program that the
government is making content-based judgments. It can inquire fur-
ther into the particular criteria by looking to the authorizing
policy.
B. Identifiable and Constitutionally Valid Message
Government has the authority to speak through its entities and
officials and, by extension, through its selection of private
speakers, because its speech adds information and ideas to the
marketplace, fulfilling listeners' interests in "mak[ing] informed
choices.",211 But not every act of assisting private speakers
208. Cf Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group, Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 577
(1995) ("[T]he parade's overall message is distilled from the individual presentations along
the way, and each unit's expression is perceived by spectators as part of the whole.").
209. Cf id. at 569-70 ("[A] private speaker does not forfeit constitutional protection
simply by combining multifarious voices, or by failing to edit their themes to isolate an exact
message as the exclusive subject matter of the speech.").
210. See Nat'l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 585 (1998) ("The [NEA]
may decide to fund particular projects for a wide variety of reasons. . .
211. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14 (1975) (per curiam).
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constitutes government speech. In the context of private speech,
the speaker's intent to speak through conduct is not enough to
render the conduct protected speech . 3 Rather, a message
reasonably understandable to listeners is required to give the
conduct Free Speech Clause value.1 The same must be true with
respect to government speech through private individuals, where
listeners' interests are paramount.
An additional requirement applies to government speech
through its selection of private speakers that does not apply when
those individuals speak without government assistance. While there
are no messages absolutely forbidden to private speakers, the same
is not true of the government. There may be some messages that
the government may not deliver.2 5 Thus, legitimate government
speech through private entities requires that the government send
an identifiable and constitutionally valid message. The specifics of
the "message" requirement will vary according to the manner by
which the government is speaking through private speakers.
1. Government Agents-The Court recently confirmed the "mes-
sage" requirement in the context of government agents. 21 6 It
emphasized that it is a "programmatic message" that "allow[s] the
Government to specify the advice deemed necessary for its legiti-
mate objectives., 217 This discretion to specify the private speakers'
message includes the ability to selectively edit its content according
to viewpoint. Absent such a "programmatic message," however, the
funded speech is private. 2's This means that the government can-
not discriminate according to viewpoint in selecting private
speakers.
The "programmatic message" requirement is more easily articu-
lated than explained. According to the Velazquez Court, it was the
212. See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 199 (1991) (suggesting that "funding by the Gov-
ernment, even when coupled with the freedom of the fund recipients to speak outside the
scope of the Government-funded project, is [not] invariably sufficient to justify Government
control over the content of expression.").
213. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1967) ("We cannot accept the view
that an apparently limitless variety of conduct can be labeled 'speech' whenever the person
engaging in the conduct intends thereby to express an idea.").
214. Cf Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 415 (1974) (noting that conduct is pro-
tected symbolic speech if the speaker intends to communicate and the communication is
"likely to be understood").
215. See Rust, 500 U.S. at 210-11 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("Clearly, there are some
bases upon which government may not rest its decision to fund or not to fund. For example,
the Members of the majority surely would agree that government may not base its decision
to support an activity upon considerations of race.").
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Legal Services Corporation Act, which prohibited funding of "an
effort to amend or otherwise challenge existing law, 2 1 9 that lacked a
programmatic message. By contrast, Title X of the Public Health
Service Act, which prohibited funding of activities that "'encourage,
promote or advocate abortion as a method of family planning,' ,
220
contained such a message. 2 ' But the two statutes are similar in many
respects. Both fund the activities of professionals to give advice to
private clients. 2 2 2 Both truncate the advice that the professional canprivat ""225
give, defining certain options as off limits. 223 Both can be character-
ized as involving discrimination on the basis of viewpoint.224 This
raises the question of why one sends a governmental message that
comports with the Constitution while the other impermissibly dis-
criminates against private speech on the basis of viewpoint.
The answer lies in the connection between the viewpoint
discriminatory speech provision and the government program.
Viewpoint discrimination in government speech is permissible
because the government is sending a message by doing it.225 In fact,
not only may the government engage in viewpoint discrimination
when it speaks or when it funds private speakers, it must do so.
That is, sending a "message" requires expressing a "viewpoint,"
226even though it need not be narrowly defined. So, when
219. Id. at 551 (ScaliaJ., dissenting).
220. Rust, 500 U.S. at 180 (quoting 42 C.ER. § 59.10(a) (1990)).
221. See Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 548.
222. See id. at 542 (stating that government-funded attorneys " ' work[] under canons of
professional responsibility that mandate [their] exercise of independent judgment on be-
half of the client'" (quoting Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 321-22 (1981))); id. at
554 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority's reliance on "professional obliga-
tion[s]" of attorneys does not distinguish Rust because physicians have "professional
responsibilities" toward their patients as well (quoting Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetri-
cians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 763 (1986))).
223. See id. at 539 (holding that attorney funding may not be used in "an effort to
amend or otherwise challenge existing law"); Rust, 500 U.S. at 180 (holding that funded
doctors may not "encourage, promote or advocate abortion as a method of family planning"
(quoting 42 C.FR. § 59.10(a) (1994))).
224. See Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 549 ("[The funding provision is] aimed at the suppression
of ideas thought inimical to the Government's own interest."); id. at 541 ("[V]iewpoint-
based funding decisions can be sustained in instances ... like Rust ... ."); Rust, 500 U.S. at
209 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("The regulations are also clearly viewpoint based. While
suppressing speech favorable to abortion with one hand, the Secretary compels antiabortion
speech with the other.") But see Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 553 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[The fund-
ing provision does not] discriminate on the basis of viewpoint, since it funds neither
challenges to nor defenses of existing welfare law.").
225. See Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 548 ("[A programmatic message] suffice[s] ... to allow
the Government to specify the advice deemed necessary for its legitimate objectives.").
226. Cf Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group, Inc., 515 U.S. 557,
568, 569 (1995) (stating that a parade is "expressive" when "marchers ... are making some
sort of collective point" even if it is not a "narrow, succinctly articulable message").
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government assists private speakers, it is itself speaking only when it
expresses something. Expressing something requires selecting
from the range of information and ideas available to send an
identifiable message.2 7 It is the viewpoint that gives meaning to the
message. So, the government speaks by means of viewpoint
discrimination in selecting the private speakers who will convey its
228message.
In Rust, the government's message was that abortion is not an
"appropriate" method of family planning.2 This message was a
230legitimate one for the government to send, and viewpoint dis-
crimination in crafting the message was necessary to send it.23 ' In
Velazquez, however, it is more difficult to link the viewpoint dis-
crimination with the government's message. The government's
viewpoint discrimination in that case was excising information, ad-
vice, and advocacy about challenges to existing law from the
private speakers' message. 32 A government message linked to the
viewpoint discrimination would be that such challenges are not
"appropriate." One problem with relying upon this message as the
basis for legitimating the government speech is that it is not clear
that the government intended to send it.
2 33
Even assuming such an intent, however, a more fundamental
problem prevents the government from relying upon it as the basis
for restricting the speech of the funded attorneys. Unlike the anti-
abortion message in Rust, the message discouraging challenges to
existing laws exceeds the bounds of legitimate government speech.
227. See id. at 570 ("Cable operators ... are engaged in protected speech activities even
when they only select programming originally produced by others.").
228. See Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 541 (holding that when the government funds private
agents, it may engage in viewpoint discrimination "'to ensure that its message is neither
garbled nor distorted by the grantee"' (quoting Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the
Univ. ofVa., 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995))).
229. 500 U.S. at 180 ("One permissible response to [a request for an abortion referral]
is that 'the project does not consider abortion an appropriate method of family planning
and therefore does not counsel or refer for abortion."' (quoting 42 C.ER. § 59.8(b) (5)
(1994))).
230. See id. at 193 ("[T]he Government is exercising the authority it possesses ... to
subsidize family planning services which will lead to conception and childbirth, and declin-
ing to 'promote or encourage abortion.'" (quoting 42 C.ER. § 59.8(b) (5) (1994))).
231. See id. ("The challenged regulations implement the statutory prohibition by pro-
hibiting counseling, referral, and the provision of information regarding abortion as a
method of family planning.").
232. 531 U.S. at 548 ("The attempted restriction is designed to insulate the Govern-
ment's interpretation of the Constitution from judicial challenge.").
233. See id. at 547 (noting that the government contends the attorney funding provision
"operates neither to maintain the current welfare system nor insulate it from attack; rather,
it helps the current welfare system function in a more efficient and fair manner by removing
from the program complex challenges to existing welfare laws").
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In some contexts, the government certainly may affirmatively
advocate the constitutionality of its laws,23' but not where it funds
lawyers to advise clients who may want to challenge them. The two
activities funding attorneys to give advice that is necessarily
opposed to the government's interest and then limiting the scope
of the advice in a way that serves the government's interest are
fundamentally inconsistent. The First Amendment protects against
the core danger of the government skewing the private speech
market to serve its own interests. Because of the importance of the
speech and the context in which it is delivered, this message, if
intended, is not legitimate.
But the government in Velazquez did not claim to be sending such
a value-ridden policy statement. Instead, it claimed such challenges
were simply not worthy of government funding.2 35 The problem with
this claim, however, is that this decision that some challenges are too
complex and expensive to fund is not a policy affirmatively embod-
ied in the government program. That is, it is not the program's
purpose to "promote" a "policy" that the viewpoint discrimination
236furthers. Rather, according to the government, the funding of par-
ticular types of challenges was simply left out, just as the entire
universe of other possible objects of government funding were left
out of this particular statute as well.237 As only a negative aspect of
the program, like so many others, the speech restriction does not
obtain the protection of government speech. Rather, it must be
evaluated as any other selective funding provision where the pro-
hibition against viewpoint discrimination applies.
The key, then, to an identifiable message in government speech
is viewpoint selectivity that affirmatively fulfills a legitimate gov-
ernment policy. When the government selectively supports private
speakers, it is the viewpoint discrimination that raises the inquiry.
Absent viewpoint discrimination, the determination of whether the
234. For example, government attorneys may argue that challenged laws are constitu-
tional. See id. at 542 (stating that a government attorney "deliver[s] the government's
message in the litigation").
235. Id. at 547 (noting that the "condition ... ensures funds can be spent for those
cases most immediate to congressional concern").
236. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995)
("[W]hen the government appropriates public funds to promote a particular policy of its
own it is entitled to say what it wishes.").
237. Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 548.
238. See Regan v. Taxation With Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 548 (1983)
(holding that the government may not "discriminate invidiously in its subsidies ... [by aim-
ing] at the suppression of dangerous ideas" (quoting Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S.
498, 513 (1959) (quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 519 (1958)))).
FALL 2002]
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
government or private individuals are "speaking" will usually not
be constitutionally significant, as the government has broad discre-
tion to establish boundaries on its aid to private speakers.2 39 So,
with respect to the determination between government and private
speech, the crucial question is not whether viewpoint discrimina-
tion exists, but how to allocate it. If it promotes a legitimate
government message, the government is speaking through private
agents.240 If it does not, then it unconstitutionally burdens the
rights of private speakers. 1
2. Government Editors--Government editors "speak" through
private speakers in a different way than the government speaks
through private agents. Each private agent speaks to promote a
particular policy for which the government is democratically ac-
countable.242  It is because the private agents deliver the
government's viewpoint to the citizenry that the government may,
in turn, select among them according to viewpoint. 43 By contrast,
the private speakers chosen by government editors do not neces-
sarily each express the government's viewpoint. Rather, they
express a range of viewpoints that, within the editor's judgment,
245best fulfill the editor's broader mandate. The government speech
that results is not the particular message of each private speaker
selected, but the compilation of private speakers viewed as a whole.
One way to determine whether the government sends an edito-
rial message is to look at when the government claims to do so.
239. See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829, 834 (stating that the government may limit a forum
to "certain groups or for the discussion of certain topics" and in allocating subsidies, the
government may give "preferential treatment [to] certain speakers").
240. See Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 541 (2001) (stating that the gov-
ernment may speak to "promote its own policies" (quoting Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of
Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 235 (2000))).
241. See id. at 548 (holding that the attorney funding condition is unconstitutional for
lack of a "programmatic message"); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 518 (1958) (holding
that the state's denial of a property exemption to those who refused to sign a loyalty state-
ment unconstitutionally "penalize [d] them for such speech").
242. See Velazquez at 541 (stating that government agents "'convey a governmental mes-
sage'" (quoting Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 833)).
243. See id. (stating that the government may take "'legitimate and appropriate steps'"
to ensure that agents convey the government's message (quoting Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at
833)).
244. The extent to which the private speakers express the government's viewpoint will
depend upon the breadth of the editorial mandate. For example, all the private speakers in
a government publication designed to stop smoking will express that viewpoint, but proba-
bly various viewpoints about how best to do so. At some point, the government's mandate
becomes so specific that the chosen speakers are, in fact, all government agents delivering
the government's policy message.
245. See Ark. Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 673 (1998) (stating that
a public broadcaster's scheduled speakers must broadly serve "the 'public interest, conven-
ience, and necessity'" (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 309(a) (1994))).
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But, because the "editor" label could be applied whenever the gov-
ernment chooses among private speakers, it is necessary to further
qualify when it can appropriately be applied.24f Like government
speech more generally, constitutional value attaches to a govern-
ment editor's decisions because they constitute "communicative
acts" that add to the speech market.247 The test for a legitimate gov-
ernment editor, then, must be whether the entity or individual
"exercises editorial discretion" in "the compilation of the speech of
third parties" so that the end result "communicate [s a] mes-
sage[I] ,,248
The appropriate way to determine when the government sends
an "editorial" message is to look to the government action estab-
lishing the editor's authority and what the editor produces
pursuant to it. An editor acts under a broad mandate, which per-
mits the expression of a number of different specific messages, but
also is accountable to some other government entity for its exer-
cises of journalistic discretion pursuant to the broader mandate.249
In addition, the editor's product should be one to which the values
of government speech attach. It should be a product that is rea-
sonably perceived by listeners as a whole, that can send a unified
message. 50 Further, it should reflect the exercise of discretion in its
composition, rather than an open access format.
251
With these indicia present, the government editor is sending an
identifiable message. Thus, the label applies to media entities that
exercise the journalistic discretion that serves Free Speech Clause
246. Cf Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 752, 777 (1995)
(O'Connor, J., concurring) ("[In the Establishment Clause inquiry], Governmental intent
cannot control .... ").
247. See Forbes, 523 U.S. at 674 ("Although programming decisions often involve the
compilation of the speech of third parties, the decisions nonetheless constitute communica-
tive acts.").
248. Id. (quoting Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Fed. Communications Comm'n, 512 U.S.
622, 636 (1994) (quoting City of Los Angeles v. Preferred Communications, Inc., 476 U.S.
488, 494 (1986))).
249. See id. at 673 ("[Editors] must exercise [discretion] to fulfill theirjournalistic pur-
pose and statutory obligations.").
250. Cf. Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group, 515 U.S. 557, 577
(1995) (holding that a parade is protected speech because its "overall message is distilled
from the individual presentations along the way, and each unit's expression is perceived by
spectators as part of the whole").
251. See Forbes, 523 U.S. at 673 ("To comply with their obligation to air programming
that serves the public interest, broadcasters must often choose among speakers expressing
different viewpoints."); cf Hurley, 515 U.S. at 569-70 ("[A] private speaker does not forfeit
constitutional protection simply by combining multifarious voices, or by failing to edit their
themes to isolate an exact message as the exclusive subject matter of the speech.").
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values. It applies to public school when they choose private
speakers to include in their curricula. It applies to government
entities that choose private speakers to participate in structured
events, such as ceremonies, symposiums, or conferences.254 It also
applies to publications, like newsletters, 255 and presentations, like
256parades, by government entities that are unified speech acts
when produced by private entities. Despite this seemingly broad
application of government editor speech protection, it remains
limited by the requirement that the government make the private
speech selections for the purpose of creating government expres-
sion, and in a way that each private speaker sends the government's
message as part of a greater whole. Beyond these situations where
the government's participation in promoting the private speech is
itself reasonably and publicly recognized as an independent speech
act, labeling government speech selections as "editorial" and thus
entitled to 'journalistic discretion" would allow the government to
skew the private speech market rather than add another voice to
it.2
57
Because a government editor's discretion parallels that of a
private editor, the issue of the legitimacy of the message sent is not
as salient in this context as with government agents. First, it may
not be possible to isolate a specific viewpoint presented by the
editor and evaluate its legitimacy.2' 8 Second, unlike government
agents, government editors do not usually express a single
"governmental message. Rather, they may express a wide range
of viewpoints consistent with their broader mandate to exercise
journalistic discretion. 26 The issue of the legitimacy of the message
will arise only when the government defines an editor's mandate in
252. See Forbes, 523 U.S. at 673-74 (stating that public broadcasters are government edi-
tors).
253. See id.
254. See id. at 674 (comparing broadcasters' activities to a public university's com-
mencement speaker selection and a public institution's lecture series choices).
255. See Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1, 8 (1986) (hold-
ing that PG&E's newsletter "receives the full protection of the First Amendment").
256. See Hurley, 515 U.S. at 570 ("The selection of contingents to make a parade is enti-
tled to [First Amendment] protection.").
257. See Forbes, 523 U.S. at 676 (noting that, in the context of a candidate debate, rec-
ognizing editorial discretion to engage in viewpoint discrimination would present "an
inevitability of skewing the electoral dialogue").
258. See Hurley, 515 U.S. at 569 (discussing the protection of expression in various ex-
amples.)
259. Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 541 (2001) (quoting Rosenberger v.
Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995)).
260. See Hurley, 515 U.S. at 569 (stating that speakers need not "edit their themes to iso-
late an exact message").
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an unconstitutional way, or the editor's administration of its
mandate clearly demonstrates that it is sending an unconstitutional
261message. In most instances, for the same reason that requiring
viewpoint neutrality in speaker access is inconsistent with editorial
discretion, evaluating a government editor's speech for legitimacy,
according to government speech principles, is inappropriate as
we11.262Well. 6
3. Government Quality Arbiters-A government quality arbiter
"speaks" by identifying and rewarding high quality private expres-
sion. A government quality arbiter does not adopt the viewpoint of
263each chosen private speaker as its own. Nevertheless, through its
selection process, a government quality arbiter adds a gloss to the
message of the private speakers. This gloss is the government's seal
of approval. Thus, the message that a government quality arbiter
sends is government endorsement of the private speech as meeting
the standards of the program.264
What constitutes "quality" is an inherently value-laden judg-
ment.265 The criteria that a government quality arbiter uses to select
private speakers can be "subjective" enough to allow for viewpoint
discrimination because such subjectivity is necessary266 to fulfill the
261. For example, the federal government could not constitutionally create a "Democ-
rats are better than Republicans" newsletter and charge a government entity with fulfilling
this mandate. Nor could a newsletter editor charged with informing the public about the
structure of democratic government exercise its discretion to send a pro-Democratic Party
message. Given the many ways that an editor can make and explain its decisions, the latter
activity would be exceedingly difficult to prove. Cf, Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 644 (1993)
(noting that a "bizarre" voting district can demonstrate that decision making was based
almost solely on race); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 360 (1886) (noting the fact that
200 Chinese applications for laundry permits were denied and all but one non-Chinese
application was accepted demonstrates discriminatory administration of a facially neutral
law).
262. See Forbes, 523 U.S. at 674-75 ("'The result [of allowing claims of access under fo-
rum precedents] would be a further erosion of the journalistic discretion of broadcasters,'
transferring 'control over the treatment of public issues from the licensees who are account-
able for broadcast performance to private individuals' who bring suit under our forum
precedents." (quoting Columbia Broad. Sys. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 124
(1973))).
263. See Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 541 (holding that government agents "convey a govern-
mental message" (quoting Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819,
833 (1995))).
264. See Nat'l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 573 (1998) (stating that
the NEA's charge is to choose and fund "artistically excellent" projects).
265. Id. (noting that the " 'excellence' threshold for NEA support" is "inherently con-
tent-based").
266. See id. at 583-85 ("Respondents' claim that the provision is facially unconstitutional
may be reduced to the argument that [its] criteria ... are sufficiently subjective that the
agency could utilize them to engage in viewpoint discrimination.... Any content-based
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"valuable" government purpose of selecting and promoting "excel-
lent" private expression.16' To have value, however, as opposed to
great First Amendment danger, these viewpoint-based government
speech selection judgments must send an identifiable and legiti-
mate message of government quality endorsement.2
Gs
One factor crucial to an identifiable government quality en-
dorsement message is an expressed government intent to send
one. Where the government disclaims responsibility for making
quality judgments among private speakers, it cannot send a quality
endorsement message. 69 Moreover, this intent must be consistent
among all selected speakers to send a meaningful message. 270 But
the government's intent to endorse its private speech selections
cannot be enough to transform its choices into government
speech.71 Otherwise, "excellent" could mean only "preferred" ex
pression, and the government could transform almost any situation
in which it chooses private speakers, including a private speech
"forum", into one where selection depends upon the "quality" of
the chosen speakers with mere "word play."
272
Another aspect of a legitimate government quality determina-
tion is the selection criteria. These must require some sort of
"esthetic" as opposed to "comparably objective" decision.272 The
Finley Court distinguished the "inherently content-based 'excel-
lence' threshold for NEA support '274 from the standard for student
publication funding in Rosenberger, which required that organiza-
tions be "'related to the educational purpose of the University' ,275
and the standard for second class mailing privileges, which are
considerations that may be taken into account in the grant-making process are a conse-
quence of the nature of arts funding.")
267. See id. at 589 (listing "valuable Government programs" that select and reward "ex-
cellence").
268. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 834 (1995)
(suggesting that "viewpoint-based restrictions" are not proper when "the University does not
itself speak or subsidize transmittal of a message it favors .... ").
269. See Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 229 (2000)
(demonstrating that the Court does not consider the government speech issue when a uni-
versity "disclaim [s] that the speech is its own").
270. For example, the government cannot claim that some, but not all, speech chosen
pursuant to a particular program is government speech because it represents quality expres-
sion. SeeHenderson v. Stadler, 112 E Supp. 2d 589, 598 (E.D. La. 2000).
271. See Nat'l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 586 (1998) (distinguishing
forum cases).
272. See Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 547 (2001) (stating that the gov-
ernment's definition of its own program is not controlling, or else the First Amendment
would become "a simple semantic exercise").
273. See Finley, 524 U.S. at 586.
274. Id.
275. Id. (quoting Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 824).
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available to "'all newspapers and other periodical publications.' ,,276
The line it drew is a fine one. In particular, the University's "educa-
tional purposes" standard required the decision maker to exercise
judgment in choosing among private speakers. Nevertheless, the
label "comparatively objective" means that the government's pur-
pose does not require it to exercise its judgment in a way that may
be viewpoint-based. 77 That is, however broad the standard for ac-
cess, it can be explained according to objective characteristics of
the speech or the speakers, without reference to the chosen exam-• 278
ples. So, the government does not send a message independent
of the program criteria in selecting private speakers. By contrast, a
quality-designating purpose is a viewpoint-based purpose, with
standards that are necessarily "susceptible to multiple interpreta-
tions."279 So, with an esthetic mandate, the two activities of setting
the standard and meeting it combine in the selection process. By
choosing private speakers, the government mixes its viewpoint with
that of the chosen private speakers and thereby sends a message
that is identifiably different than the description of the program.
Another aspect of an identifiable quality judgment message is
that the esthetic judgment mandate be the government's primary
purpose in establishing the private speech selection program. Be-
cause the purpose to select "excellent" speakers can so easily blend
into a purpose to select merely "favored" speakers, this require-
ment is necessary to protect the private speech forum. 2s The
government does not have a primary quality designation purpose
when this is not clearly evident in the structure and administration
of the program."'
This means that the government will generally not have a
primary quality designation purpose when an important purpose
of the government/private speech interaction is to make or save
276. Id. (quoting Hannegan v. Esquire, Inc., 327 U.S. 146, 148 n.1 (1946)).
277. See Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 230 (2000)
(stating that "viewpoint neutrality" is the operational principle of activities fee funding to
stimulate student discussion).
278. See id. at 232 (noting that even though topics or geographical rules may explain
criteria for funding, the speech the University seeks to promote "is distinguished not by
discernable limits but by its vast, unexplored bounds").
279. Finley, 524 U.S. at 583.
280. In any nonpublic forum, the government could claim that its ability to limit access
to "appropriate" speakers allows it to make potentially viewpoint-based quality judgments.
See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 804 (1985) ("The
Government's consistent policy has been to limit participation in [its workplace charitable
contribution campaign] to 'appropriate' voluntary agencies....").
281. See Finley, 524 U.S. at 573 (noting that "'professional excellence'" is an NEA fund-
ing priority (quoting 20 U.S.C. §§ 953(b), 954(c) (1)-(10)) (1994)).
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government money.282 While the government's "proprietor" role
supports its ability to discriminate among speakers in a non-
2828
viewpoint-based way s it does not support its ability to make
selections according to viewpoint.28 The moneymaking purpose
means that the government is not primarily interested in speaking
through its private speaker selections.85  In addition, the
moneymaking motive heightens the danger that the government will
act to suppress minority viewpoints as this may well correspond to
286increased profitability of the program. Absent very aggressive
efforts by the government to send an identifiable message through its
selection of private speakers and to minimize the dangers of minority
speech suppression in doing so, that the government/private speech
interaction makes or saves government money should mean that
"speaking" is not the government's primary purpose.
The "competitive process" according to which government sup-
port is awarded is another important aspect of an identifiable
government message. Like an editor, a quality arbiter, in the course
of her inherently non-neutral decision making,2 7 Will "facilitate the
expression of some viewpoints instead of others."28 The message of
quality endorsement justifies its selectivity. Nevertheless, a competi-
tive process can become unconstitutional if the arbiter's decisions
• •,289
"raise[] concern about the suppression of disfavored viewpoints.
Decisions raise this concern when they are so indiscriminating that
they no longer send an affirmative message about what constitutes
quality expression but instead merely advertise what viewpoint the
government disfavors.
282. See id. at 589 (characterizing the government, through the NEA, as "acting as pa-
tron").
283. See Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 678 (1992)
("Where the government is acting as a proprietor, managing its internal operations, rather
than acting as lawmaker with the power to regulate or license, its action will not be subjected
to the heightened review to which its actions as a lawmaker may be subject.").
284. Id. at 679 (stating that even when the government acts as proprietor, it cannot
make an "effort to suppress the speaker's activity due to disagreement with the speaker's
view").
285. See id. at 682 ("[The status of airports as] commercial establishments ... designed
to make a regulated profit [means that] it cannot fairly be said that an airport terminal has
as a principal purpose promoting 'the free exchange of ideas.'" (quoting Cornelius, 473 U.S.
at 800)).
286. See Chicago ACORN, SEIU Local No. 880 v. Metro. Pier & Exposition, 150 F.3d
695, 701 (7th Cir. 1998) (stating that the government may not discriminate in access to
property according to whether a group is likely to "generate favorable publicity" because this
"would be a form of the heckler's veto").
287. See Nat'l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 585 (1998) (stating that
the artistic worth standard and absolute neutrality are incompatible).
288. Ark. Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 674 (1998).
289. Finley, 524 U.S. at 587.
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Here, some evaluation of whether the government is legitimately
"selecting in," as opposed to illegitimately "selecting out," must be
made. "Selecting in" means that the government is choosing pri-
vate speakers according to established criteria so that the selection
process sends a coherent message of what the government consid-
ers to be "excellent." The NEA, which denies "the majority of the
grant applications," including many that meet the "excellence"
threshold, clearly "selects in."
29
0
But such an arbitrary rule cannot be a constitutional require-
ment. An editor, such as a parade organizer, does not "forfeit
constitutional protection" simply by being "rather lenient in admit-
ting participants." 291 So long as the marchers are "making some sort
of collective point," the selection process is expressive activity enti-
tied to First Amendment protection. 292 Similarly, the government
can make an identifiable quality endorsement statement even if it
endorses a majority of the applicants to a program. Potential appli-
cants may well engage in self-selection according to the published
requirements of the program. In addition, when a program is not
highly selective, its administration can be an important factor that
supports the government's claim that it is nevertheless engaged in
meaningful quality selection and endorsement. The program's
structure should demonstrate an effort to apply the program's
value-based criteria to applications in a consistent way that pro-
duces a coherent body of quality endorsements. Decision making
by a committee, composed in part of individuals with particular
expertise in the type of quality sought by the program, will bolster
the credibility of the quality endorsements. So, too, will explana-
tions, at least of rejections, that refer to the program's criteria to
explain why the applications did not meet them.
As with the other types of government speech, the quality
endorsement message must be legitimate. This means that the
government cannot define its quality standards to promote a
message through its private speech selections that it is not, itself,
allowed to send. This also means that program administrators
cannot apply the criteria to reach the same result. Provable
instances of this type of government activity, however, will be rare.293
To create a meaningful message of quality endorsement, a
government editor must enjoy broad discretion to select which
290. Id. at 585.
291. Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group, 515 U.S. 557, 569 (1995).
292. Id. at 568.
293. See supra Part II.B.2 (noting the difficulty of proving abuse of discretion by gov-
ernment editors).
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private applicants best meet the quality standards of the program.
Absent blatant use of unconstitutional considerations by the
government, judicial intrusion to determine the legitimacy of the
government quality arbiter's judgments would undermine the
294values that attach to the program.
C. Non Speech-Suppressing Impact
Legitimate government speech must also have a non-speech-
suppressing impact. The concern with speech suppression is the
core of the free speech guarantee and underpins the strict limits
on the government's ability to regulate private speakers. 9" The
concern differs, however, when the issue is government speech or
government assistance of private speakers. While these activities
add to the speech market, they do not, on their face, "suppress"
any other speech that seeks to enter. For this reason, the Court has
recognized a "'basic difference'" between speech subsidies and
speech regulations, tolerating viewpoint discriminatory assistance
to private speakers when the government legitimately speaks
through them.297
But the value of government speech depends upon it adding to
a speech market that remains robust.29s The power of government
is such that even purely additive speech may sometimes
"'threaten[] to suppress the expression of particular ideas or view-
points.' ,,2.' This threat then outweighs the value of government
speech and, when it is present, establishes the constitutional limit
on the government's ability to do so.0
294. See Finley, 524 U.S. at 589-90 (stating that "imprecise considerations" and a "subjec-
tive selection process" are necessary parts of "valuable Government programs" that identify
and reward quality private expression).
295. SeeRA.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992).
296. Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 552 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(quoting Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 475 (1977)).
297. See id. at 541 ("[V]iewpoint-based funding decisions can be sustained [when the
government funds private speakers as its agents.]").
298. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) (stating that there is "a pro-
found national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be
uninhibited, robust and wide-open ....").
299. Nat'l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 587 (1998) (quoting Leathers
v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 447 (1991)).
300. See id. (stating that the administration of a competitive grant program would be
unconstitutional if it "raise [d] concern about the suppression of disfavored viewpoints"); see
YUDOF, supra note 2, at 15 (arguing that the government should be prohibited from "at-
tempt[ing] to fashion a majority will through uncontrolled indoctrination activities")
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The same balance applies when the government speaks through
its selection of private speakers.30 Although the government may
discriminate according to viewpoint, it may not do so "invidi-
ously."
3 2 It may not "leverage its [selection] power ... into a
penalty on disfavored viewpoints, °309 "'manipulate[]"' it to have a
"'coercive effect,' ,3114 or "impos[e] ... a ... burden calculated to
drive 'certain ideas or viewpoints from the marketplace.' ,301 Most
recently, the Court has emphasized that selective government assis-
tance to private speakers may not "use an existing medium of
expression and ... control it, in a class of cases, in ways which dis-
tort its usual functioning."
3 06
These explanations remain opaque and controversial. 30' Their
applications, as well as examination of the values that support the
government's ability to speak by assisting private speakers, help to
reveal the specific aspects of the requirement that government aid
to private speakers not suppress private viewpoints.
1. Dominating-The reason that constitutional doctrine treats
government restrictions on private speakers and government
assistance to private speakers differently is that the effects of these
government actions on the speech market is presumed to be
different. Content-based government regulation of the private
speech market presumptively "skews" it in a way that thwarts Free
Speech Clause values, while government speech through private
speakers presumptively adds the value of government speech while
(emphasis in the original); Cole, supra note 2, at 680 (noting that a danger of government
speech is "the indoctrinating effect of a monopolized marketplace of ideas").
301. See e.g., Finley, 524 U.S. at 587 (stating that an otherwise constitutional subsidy
would be invalid if it "raise [d) concern about the suppression of disfavored viewpoints").
302. See id. (stating that although the NEA may consider subjective factors of "decency"
and "respect for the diverse beliefs and values of the American public," id. at 582, applica-
tion of the factors "may be shown to be the product of invidious viewpoint discrimination").
303. Id.
304. Id. (quoting Ark. Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 237 (1987) (Scalia,
J., dissenting)).
305. Id. (quoting Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y State Crime Victims Bd.,
502 U.S. 105, 116 (1991)).
306. Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 543 (2001).
307. Compare id. at 544 (stating that the attorney funding condition "effect[s a] serious
and fundamental restriction on advocacy of attorneys and the functioning of the judiciary"),
with id. at 552 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("When the limited spending program does not create
a public forum, proving coercion is virtually impossible ... because the criterion of uncon-
stitutionality is whether denial of the subsidy threatens 'to drive certain ideas or viewpoints
from the marketplace."' (quoting Finley, 524 U.S. at 587)).
308. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992) ("Content-based regulations
are presumptively invalid.").
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preserving the value of a robust private speech market. 39 Either of
these presumptions, however, can be defeated by a showing that,
under particular circumstances, they are incorrect. The government
can justify what would otherwise be unconstitutional private speech
restriction by offering sufficient justification that changes the
constitutional balance. ° Similarly, a showing that what would
otherwise be legitimate government speech through private
speakers has the effect of an unconstitutional speech restriction
changes the constitutional balance as well.' Specifically,
government speech and its speech through private speakers has
value because it leaves opportunities for private speech open. If, in
a particular context, it dominates to such an extent that this
openness does not exist, the government speech assistance violates
S • 312
the Constitution.
The government can dominate speech unconstitutionally with
its assistance to private speakers in two different ways. One way is to
exert extraordinary control in a particular medium of expression.
This determination is difficult because it requires identifying the
medium and the degree of the government's influence in it. This
concern will apply where the government assistance applies
broadly to a particular means of expression, like the press,3 3 the
broadcast media, 14 or the mail system. 5 That the assistance applies
broadly means that the impact of any message that the government
sends through its choice of private speakers may potentially domi-
nate the discussion at issue.1 6 Whether the government message is
309. See Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 541.
310. See Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 211 (1992) (holding that a restriction on po-
litical speech within 100 feet of a polling place is "the rare case in which ... a law survives
strict scrutiny").
311. See Finley, 524 U.S. at 587 (stating that denial of a grant may be unconstitutional if
it is the product of "invidious viewpoint discrimination").
312. See id. ("'[Djifferential taxation of First Amendment speakers is constitutionally
suspect when it threatens to suppress the expression of particular ideas or viewpoints.'"
(quoting Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 447 (1991))).
313. See Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minn. Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575,
592 (1983) (holding that a special use tax on the cost of paper and ink violated the Consti-
tution because it applied only to the press and certain publications within the press).
314. See Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 453 (1991) (holding that a sales tax on cable
television services does not violate the Constitution because it is "broad-based" and "content-
neutral").
315. See Finley, 524 U.S. at 586 (discussing Hannegan v. Esquire, Inc., 327 U.S. 146, 148
n.1 (1946) and stating that second class mailing privileges are an example of a "compara-
tively objective decision [] on allocating public benefits").
316. See Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 552 (2001) ("Proving unconstitu-
tional coercion is difficult enough when the spending program has universal coverage and
excludes only certain speech.... [It] is harder still when a spending program is not univer-
sal but limited, providing benefits to a restricted number of recipients.").
[VOL. 36:1
Who's Talking?
in fact dominant will depend upon the nature of the restriction




Another way that the government can dominate is by controlling
too much of a speaker's speech with its assistance. The government
can control a speaker's speech to the extent of its assistance, but no
more. So, in FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal.,1 s Congress went
too far by prohibiting stations that received funding from editorial-
izing, even with nongovernmental funds.3M9 By exercising this
degree of control over private speakers, Congress's effort was "to
limit discussion of controversial topics and thus to shape the
agenda for public debate." 20 By contrast, the Court in Rust held
that the government's restriction of Title X doctors' speech was
permissibly limited to the project, leaving the grantee "unfettered"
to engage in abortion-related speech and activities outside the
321scope of the program.
Both of these inquiries to ensure a non-speech-suppressing ef-
fect of the government action are important even when the
government is accountable for its advocacy and delivers an identi-
fiable message. The presumption that legitimates government
speech, and thus government speech through the selection of pri-
vate speakers, is that the government's message is additive. If,
contrary to this presumption, the message dominates so that the
assistance to private speakers in effect suppresses the speech of
others, the government speech is no longer legitimate and the pri-
vate speech assistance program must meet the requirement of
viewpoint neutrality that applies when the government is not itself
speaking.
2. Targeting-The government's purposeful targeting of par-
ticular viewpoints for censorship is antithetical to the free speech
322guarantee. Even where constitutional doctrine is broadly tolerantof formally neutral government actions that disproportionately
317. See Leathers, 499 U.S. at 447 (stating that differential taxation of the press as a
whole or of particular speakers within it raises a particular First Amendment concern be-
cause "[tihe press plays a unique role as a check on government abuse").
318. 468 U.S. 364 (1984).
319. See id. at 400 ("The station has no way of limiting the use of its federal funds to all
noneditorializing activities, and, more importantly, it is barred from using even wholly pri-
vate funds to finance its editorial activity.").
320. Id. at 384.
321. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 196 (1991).
322. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995)
("The government must abstain from regulating speech when the specific motivating ideol-
ogy or the opinion or perspective of the speaker is the rationale for the restriction.").
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impact particular groups, it invalidates government actions that
seem designed to disadvantage them.23
This deliberate pinpointing behavior is what the Court most
clearly has in mind when it condemns "invidious viewpoint dis-
crimination" in the context of government aid to private
speakers. 324 Although what is at issue is a government-provided
benefit, not a direct speech restriction, that the disadvantage is
"target[ed at] a small group" raises constitutional concerns for sev-
eral reasons. One is that the government's purpose, rather than
sending a message composed of the expression of the included
speakers, is to penalize the expression of those who are not in-
cluded . The purpose to harm speakers because of the viewpoints
they express is not legitimate. 327 Another reason is that, even with-
out proof of an intent to censor particular viewpoints, a
government action structured to disadvantage "particular ideas or
viewpoints" nevertheless "threatens to suppress [them] 8 Yet an-
other reason that such targeting raises constitutional concern is
that it suggests that the political process did not provide adequate
protection for the disadvantaged speakers.29 Where the political
323. See Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531-33
(1993) ("[O]ur cases establish the general proposition that a law that is neutral and of gen-
eral applicability need not bejustified by a compelling governmental interest even if the law
has the incidental effect of burdening a particular religious practice.... [However,] a law
targeting religious beliefs as such is never permissible.... [I]f the object of a law is to in-
fringe upon or restrict practices because of their religious motivation, the law is not neutral,
and it is invalid unless it is justified by a compelling interest and is narrowly tailored to ad-
vance that interest.") (citations omitted).
324. Nat'l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 587 (1998) ("[E]ven in the
provision of subsidies, the Government may not 'ai[m] at the suppression of dangerous
ideas.'" (quoting Regan v. Taxation With Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 550
(1983))).
325. Ark. Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 229 (1987).
326. See Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439,446 (1991) ("'[W]hen the exemption selects
such a narrowly defined group to bear the full burden of the tax, the tax begins to resemble
more a penalty for a few of the largest newspapers than an attempt to favor struggling
smaller enterprises.'" (quoting Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minn. Comm'r of Reve-
nue, 460 U.S. 575, 592 (1993))).
327. See Finley, 524 U.S. at 587 ("Government funding [may not] result[] in the imposi-
tion of a disproportionate burden calculated to drive 'certain ideas or viewpoints from the
marketplace.'" (quoting Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd.,
502 U.S. 105, 116 (1991))).
328. Leathers, 499 U.S. at 447. "'Illicit legislative intent is not the sine qua non of a viola-
tion of the First Amendment.'" Id. at 445 (quoting Minneapolis Star, 460 U.S. at 592)).
329. See id. at 445-46 ("[Tlhe general applicability of any burdensome ... law helps to
ensure that it will be met with widespread opposition. When such a law applies only to a
single constituency, however, it is insulated from this political constraint.").
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processes are not sufficient to protect minority interests, it is more
appropriate for the Court to intervene."O
Despite the concern with "targeting," the government may, in its
interactions with private speakers, be "selective." Legitimate view-
point selectivity occurs when the favored viewpoints send a
legitimate government message. Illegitimate viewpoint targeting
occurs when the exclusion of certain ideas overwhelms the inclu-
sion of others in defining the purpose of the government action.
Several circumstances indicate when such unconstitutional view-
point targeting is present.
First, the government targets unconstitutionally when it focuses
a disadvantage, rather than an advantage, at a small group. The
Court has invalidated taxes directed at media subgroups.3 3' The
Court found that, at least in the context of a tax imposed on the
press, "a tax on a small number of speakers runs the risk of affect-
ing only a limited range of views." 3 32 This, in turn, poses the danger
that the government action "will distort the market for ideas., 333 By
contrast, a tax benefit for lobbying solely for veterans' groups did
334not raise this type of targeting concern.
Second, to constitute invidious targeting, a disadvantage must be
explicitly directed at ideas or, in context, pose the high risk of
viewpoint discrimination that the Court found in the media
cases. 3 5 As the Court has noted, "a differential burden on speakers
is insufficient by itself to raise First Amendment concerns."3 6 So, a
tax exemption solely for veterans' groups is constitutional because
is does not "discriminate[] on the basis of ideas. ''37 Similarly,
although the Finley Court discussed the possibility that the
government could target viewpoints in arts funding, it found that
the NEA "decency and respect" provision, even though enacted in
330. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938)
("[P]rejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends
seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to
protect minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial in-
quiry.").
331. See Leathers, 499 U.S. at 448.
332. Id. (describing Minneapolis Star, 460 U.S. at 592 and Ark. Writers' Project, Inc. v.
Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 229 (1987)).
333. Id.
334. See Regan v. Taxation With Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 548 (1983)
("[There is] no indication that the statute was intended to suppress any ideas or any demon-
stration that it has had that effect").
335. See Leathers, 499 U.S. at 448 (describing Minneapolis Star, 460 U.S. at 592 and Ark.
Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 229 (1987)).
336. Id. at 452.
337. Id. at 450 (describing Regan, 461 U.S. 540).
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reaction to the work of only a few artists,38 did not do so. 339 Its
vague terms, which were advisory only, did not "engender the kind
of directed viewpoint discrimination" that violates the• • 340
Constitution. By contrast, the Court found this type of directed
viewpoint discrimination in Velazquez; by "defin[ing] the scope of
litigation it fund[ed] to exclude certain vital theories and ideas,"
the government "aimed at the suppression of ideas thought
inimical to [its] own interest."
3 41
Third, the nature of the institution disadvantaged may impact a
determination of whether the government is impermissibly target-
ing viewpoints. In several of the media tax cases, the Court found
impermissible targeting even though the disadvantage was not ex-
plicitly defined in viewpoint terms. 42 It later explained one of its
holdings as depending in part on the fact that the institution tar-
geted for disadvantage was the press, which "plays a unique role as
a check on government abuse." 43 The Court's perception of the
institution targeted also may explain its different results in Velazquez
and Rust. According to the Court, the attorney funding provision
in Velazquez interfered with thejudiciary's "primary mission."3 44 The
Court did not view the speech restriction in Rust as a drastic intru-
sion into the medical profession's duties. 5
In sum, the targeting inquiry looks to whether the government,
in the guise of defining its program, has actually "aim[ed] at the
suppression of dangerous ideas."3 46 Impermissible targeting occurs
when the government disadvantages a narrowly defined group of
speakers or ideas. Both the structure of the program and other
evidence of the government's intent are relevant to this inquiry.
7
Because the government can discriminate according to the
viewpoints of private speakers when it is speaking legitimately, a
determination that the government has impermissibly targeted
338. Nat'l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 574 (1998).
339. Id. at 587.
340. Id. at 583.
341. Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 548,549 (2001).
342. See e.g., Minneapolis Star, 460 U.S. at 592.
343. Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 447 (1991).
344. 531 U.S. at 545 ("By seeking to prohibit the analysis of certain legal issues and to
truncate presentation to the courts, the enactment under review prohibits speech and ex-
pression upon which courts must depend for the proper exercise of the judicial power.").
345. 500 U.S. 173, 200 (1991) ("[T]he Title X program regulations do not significantly
impinge upon the doctor-patient relationship.").
346. Nat'l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 587 (1998) (quoting Regan v.
Taxation With Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 550 (1983)).
347. See Leathers, 499 U.S. at 445 (noting that the Court invalidated a differential tax in
Minneapolis Star, 460 U.S. 575 (1983), although there was "no evidence of impermissible
legislative motive in the case apart from the structure of the tax itself").
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certain speakers is a determination that it is not speaking
legitimately. Rather, the circumstances indicate that disadvantaging
viewpoints, rather than favoring others, is the government's
primary objective.
3. Distorting-Most recently, the Court invalidated Congress's
attempt to condition Legal Services Corporation attorney funding
on the ground that it sought "to use an existing medium of expres-
sion and to control it, in a class of cases, in ways which distort its
usual functioning."048 Another example of "distortion" was Con-
gress's attempt to prohibit editorializing by funded public
349television stations.
But, although government "distortion" of the private speech
market is invalid, government influence of the private speech mar-
ket through selective aid to private speakers is permitted when the
government legitimately speaks through its selection of private
speakers. ° In fact, when it does so, it is the government's message
and not the private speech market that is protected from "distor-
tion. " 5
According to the Court, what distinguishes impermissible
speech market "distortion" from legitimate government influence
of the private speech market is the government's use of a medium
"in an unconventional way to suppress speech inherent [to it] .052
Its example of permissible government influence is where broad-
casters choose their programming under a system where the
exercise of editorial discretion is expected .
But the appeal to the audience's background expectations to
explain the difference between unconstitutional "distortion" and
proper influence is insufficient. First, the government structures its
private speech interactions and so can make clear the extent of its
influence on the private speech market. In this way, the government
can alter the audience's expectations about the "conventions" of the
medium at issue. Second, the appeal to the conventional way that a
medium functions does not explain the Court's decision in Rust.
There, the government entered the doctor/patient counseling
348. Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 543, 549 (2001).
349. Id. (citing FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364 (1984)).
350. Id. at 541.
351. Id. (stating that the government may ensure that its message "is neither garbled
nor distorted by the grantee" (quoting Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va.,
515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995)).
352. Id. at 543.
353. Id.
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relationship, prohibiting a subject of information and advice, 3 54
where by convention a patient would expect unrestricted
counseling.
These considerations indicate that the concern with "distortion"
must be identified more precisely. Unconstitutional distortion must
be that which cannot be undone merely by disclosure. One way
that the government can distort the private speech market in a way
that cannot be remedied by disclosure is to dominate the medium
or the particular funded speakers. The distortion that occurred in
FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal., where the government sought
to control more of the speaker's expression than it funded, is best
355explained as this type of dominance. But the government did not
do this in funding the LSC attorneys at issue in Velazquez. That the
government "dr[e]w lines around [its] program to exclude ...
those arguments and theories Congress finds unacceptable but
which by their nature are within the province of the courts to con-
sider"35 6 does not distinguish LSC attorney funding from the family
planning clinic funding in Rust.
The Court's further distinction from Rust was that the LSC at-
torney's clients were required to forfeit government-funded
representation when forbidden questions arose, whereas Title X
clinic patients could receive joint advice, seeking abortion-related
information from a entity that did not receive government fund-
357ing. Explained only in this way, the distinction does not appear
significant enough to sway a constitutional decision. It points,
however, to a consideration that is of greater constitutional dimen-
sion.
The concern with "distortion" is a concern with speech market
impact that the government cannot disclaim. With enough speci-
ficity, the government can disclaim anything to its particular
audience. The concern here must be with an impact beyond the
particular audience. The Court's stated concern in Velazquez was
that the forbidden arguments would not be presented to courts.9
The dissent's response was that the government simply will not pay
for it;3 60 no "distortion" occurs because exactly the same result
354. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 179 (1991).
355. See supra Part III.A.
356. Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 546.
357. Id. at 546-47.
358. See id. at 558 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[I]t is impossible to see how this difference
from Rust has any bearing upon the First Amendment question.").
359. Id. at 547.
360. Id. at 556 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[I]f the Government chooses not to subsidize
the presentation of some ... questions, that in no way 'distorts' the courts' role.").
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would occur if the government permissibly declined to subsidize
welfare benefits cases at all.36'
Consequently, the "distortion" concern must be that by paying
for some, but not all, of the service, the government is altering the
speech market from what it would be absent government assis-
tance. In particular, the concern must be that by paying for some
of a service, the government distorts the market by making it less
likely that the rest of the service, concerning the forbidden topics,
will get paid for.
An analogy to tort law best explains the Court's concern with
"distortion." The no duty to rescue rules in tort law generally con-
tain an exception which embodies this concern. A person need not
come to another's aid. If, however, a person begins the aid in such
a way that deters others from assisting, that person becomes legally
responsible for completing thejob . 3 6 It is true that the government
need not provide aid to private speakers. But, when it decides to do
so, certain rules limit its ability to adversely impact the private
speech market. One is the rule that sometimes government assis-
tance becomes a private speech "forum," where its ability to
discriminate among private speakers is limited by the articulated
boundaries. Another is the rule against distortion. The govern-
ment cannot structure its aid to private speakers in such a way that
their expression of certain ideas is less advantaged than if the gov-
ernment had provided no assistance at all.
Whether this consideration actually distinguishes LSC funding
from Title X funding is not entirely clear. It at least provides a
theoretical basis for doing so. Plausibly, by providing government-
funded lawyers to represent "welfare claimants," the government
created the perception in the legal community that would
otherwise represent them on a pro bono basis that their needs
were met. By funding lawyers to represent "welfare claimants," and
then excising certain types of challenges, the government possibly
deterred private lawyers from providing even the unfunded
services. The same is not necessarily true where the government
provides family planning services without including abortion.
Information about abortion is privately available and, although the
mechanics of the procedure require expert advice, the existence of
the option and the general considerations that surround it are well
361. See id. (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The same result would ensue from excluding LSC-
funded lawyers from welfare litigation entirely.").
362. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 323 & cmt. e (1965); Jennifer L. Gron-
inger, Comment, No Duty to Rescue, 26 PEPP. L. Rav. 353, 363-68 (1999) (noting this as an
exception to the no duty to rescue rule).
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known. This is less true of the possibility of a legal challenge based
upon a law's invalidity and the considerations that would bear
upon doing so.
In sum, the concern with the government "distorting" the
speech market by selectively assisting private speakers properly re-
lates to an influence that cannot be effectively disclaimed. Such an
influence occurs when the government's assistance to private
speakers is comprehensive enough that it induces inaction on the
part of private speakers who might otherwise enter the speech
market.
III. APPLYING THE ANALYSIS
Governments interact with private speakers in numerous ways.
These interactions include government signs, bulletin boards and
display cases, advertising space on public vehicles or property, li-
cense plates, and more general programs to promote private
expression for aesthetic or public interest purposes. In all of these
instances, governments claim the discretion to pick and choose
among private speaker applicants and, specifically, to deny access
to unwanted speakers. Variations in the structure and administra-
tion of the interactions lead to different conclusions about their
abilities to do so.
A. Signs
When government officials or agencies determine, without so-
licitation of private input, the content of signs to be placed along
highways or at street intersections, the information on the signs is
government speech. 36 3 Private speakers may not claim access. A dif-
ferent situation arises, however, when the government uses its signs
to identify private groups or convey their messages.5 6 The message
of the signs becomes a mixture of public and private input. When
the government wants to exclude some speakers while including
others, the constitutional question becomes: who's talking?
363. See, e.g., East Timor Action Network, Inc. v. City of New York, 71 F. Supp. 2d 334,
337-38 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
364. See id. at 343-44 (stating that New York City's "policy of approving applications for
temporary street signs from private entities constitutes the opening up of a limited public
forum").
[VOL. 36:1
FALL 2002] Who's 7hlking?
One controversy concerns Adopt-A-Highway signs posted by
states with highway clean-up programs staffed by private organiza-
tions. 165 Under these programs, private groups "adopt" a portion of
a state highway to clean and maintain. The state department of
transportation then erects a sign along that portion of the highway
166acknowledging the group's participation. In several states, the
entity charged with administering the program denied the Ku Klux
Klan's application to participate.36 ' Although the reasons for deny-
ing the applications varied somewhat in their particulars, all made
reference to the Klan's discriminatory philosophy and violent ac-
tivities. 68 The Klan's claim in each case was that the government's
rejection of its application to participate in the program was un-
constitutionally viewpoint-related.
Most of the courts that reviewed the claim analyzed the Adopt-A-
Highway program as a private speech forum.36 9 Although they
characterized the forum differendy, 70 and reached different results
365. See, e.g., Missouri v. Cuffley, 927 F Supp. 1248 (E.D. Mo. 1996). "[The] Adopt-A-
Highway Program ... is a voluntary program enacted to promote litter control and to re-
duce the costs of litter abatement to the [Highway and Transportation] Commission." Id. at
1251-52.
366. See Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. Ark. State Highway & Transp. Dep't, 807 F Supp.
1427, 1430 (W.D. Ark. 1992).
367. See id. at 1431; Cuffley v. Mickes, 208 F.3d 702, 705 (8th Cir. 2000); Texas v. Knights
of the Ku Klux Klan, 58 F.3d 1075, 1077 (5th Cir. 1995) (in which the state sought declara-
tory judgment before rejecting the KKK's application).
368. See Texas v. KKK, 58 E3d at 1079 (noting that the particular portion of highway that
the Klan wanted to adopt was subject to a federal court desegregation order and injunction
prohibiting the Klan from blocking access and intimidating residents; a state may reasonably
deny participation in the Adopt-A-Highway Program based on its conclusion that "the Klan's
adoption of a section of highway outside the project would result in further intimidation of
the residents of the housing project and would create unreasonable conflict"); Missouri v.
Cuffley, 927 E Supp. at 1259 ("'[The Commission] does not want to be associated with [the
Klan's] beliefs or values"' (quoting the Commission's Motion for Summary Judgment at
19)); KKK v. Arkansas, 807 E Supp. at 1431 (quoting a memorandum by the Chief Counsel
for the Highway an( Transportation Department which stated that a sign would be "harmful
to the public image" of the program and department, would "pose a safety hazard" to par-
ticipants, passing motorists and state employees, would "jeopardize the State's eligibility in
receiving Federal funds for future construction projects," and "would not be consistent with
the aims of the State to spend State funds for signs that would promote the Klan").
369. See e.g., KKK v. Arkansas, 807 E Supp. at 1431; but see Cuffley v. Mickes, 208 F.3d at
706 n.3 ("We need not discuss ... whether the Adopt-A-Highway program is a public forum"
because "[wihether this claim arises under the Equal Protection Clause or the First
Amendment, it is clear that the State may not deny access to the Adopt-A-Highway program
based on the applicant's views.").
370. Compare Missouri v. Cuffley, 927 F. Supp. at 1257 ("[T]he forum is most likely a lim-
ited or designated public forum."), Texas v. Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, 853 E Supp. 958,
959 n.3 (E.D. Tex. 1994) (suggesting that "it [is not] necessary ... to determine with cer-
tainty the specific type of public forum being used; both are bound by the same standard."),
and KKK v. Arkansas, 807 F. Supp. at 1434, 1436 (stating that either "highway rights-of-way
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as to the constitutionality of the particular decision at issue,37 1 they
agreed that because the program was some type of private speech
forum, the government could not discriminate among participants
according to their viewpoints.
3 72
The conclusion that states cannot deny access to their Adopt-A-
Highway programs based on applicants' viewpoints is correct, but
the application of forum analysis to reach it is not. Forum analysis
is appropriate when the government action at issue impacts private
individuals' free speech rights. For the government's action to raise
a Free Speech Clause issue, the government program must impact
the ability of private entities to "speak". Analysis of the structure of
the Adopt-A-Highway programs reveals that they do not do so.
Certainly, speech occurs through state Adopt-A-Highway pro-
grams, but it is not private speech. The speech at issue is that which
occurs on the signs that acknowledge the groups that provide
highway clean-up services.373 The programs are best characterized
are traditional public forums" or the state has created a forum through the program), with
Texas v. KKI, 58 E3d at 1078 (the program is a nonpublic forum), and Cuffley v. Mickes, 44 E
Supp. 2d at 1026, 1027 ("[TJhe Court disagrees somewhat with the forum analysis in Cuffley
/"; "the program does constitute a forum, but a nonpublic one.").
371. Compare Texas v. KKK, 58 E3d at 1081 (holding that "[o]n the specific facts of this
case," exclusion of the KKK is constitutional), and Texas v. KKI 853 F. Supp. at 959-60 (hold-
ing that the state has compelling reasons for excluding KKK), with Cuffley v. Mickes, 44 F Supp.
2d at 1030 (holding exclusion of the KKK unconstitutional), Missouri v. Cuffley, 927 E Supp. at
1265 (holding exclusion of the KKK unconstitutional), and KKK v. Arkansas, 807 E Supp. at
1438 (holding denial of KKK's application unconstitutional).
372. See Texas v. KKY, 58 F.3d at 1080 ("The State's rejection of the Klan's application to
the [p]rogram constitutes a viewpoint-neutral restriction on speech."); Cuffley v. Mickes, 44 E
Supp.3d at 1028 ("Regardless of how obviously flawed and unfortunate the Klan's beliefs may
be, the [state] may not base its decision to exclude the Klan from the ... program on those
beliefs."); Missouri v. Cuffley, 927 F. Supp. at 1264 ("[T]he exclusion of the Klan ... is based
purely on the viewpoint of the Klan.... [and so] violates the First Amendment.. ."); Texas v.
KKK 853 E Supp. at 960 ("[Tlhere is a compelling state interest which outweighs the Ku Klux
Klan's [F]irst [A]mendment right to participate in the ... program..."); KKK v. Arkansas, 807
F. Supp. at 1436 ("A state may not grant the use of a forum to groups who use it to express
popular views, but deny use to those wishing to express views not favored by the public...")).
373. Some courts have found the groups' clean-up activities themselves to be expressive
conduct. See Missouri v. Cuffley, 927 E Supp. at 1255 ("It is the picking up of litter which conveys
the message to the traveling public, as opposed to the sign."); KKK v. Arkansas, 807 F. Supp. at
1435-36 ("[Participating groups] are saying or hoping to say to the traveling public by actions
and deeds.., that they are 'good' and environmentally conscious, and thus good citizens and
politically and socially correct."). But under this reasoning, any volunteer activity is expressive
conduct. Even nonvolunteer activity would be expressive, conveying messages such as "I am a
carpenter" or "I can ride a bike." To have meaning, expressive conduct must be limited to
situations where a speaker engages in conduct to convey a message broader than the fact that
he is engaging in the conduct. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968) (noting
the argument that draft card burning conveys opposition to draft); Tinker v. Des Moines In-
dep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 510-11 (1969) (stating that black armbands convey
opposition to war); Clark v. Cmty. For Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984) (stating
that sleeping in a park conveys the plight of the homeless).
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as ones where the government exchanges its acknowledgment of a
group's participation for the groups' services. 74 Unquestionably,
groups are motivated to participate in the program because of the
acknowledgment that they will receive. But that motivation does
not mean that it is the groups that are speaking. Rather, the par-
ticipating groups effectively "buy" government speech. The
highway signs contain only the name of the participants, all listed
in exactly the same format. 37' The signs are produced and erected
by the state, and directly link the participants with the activity they
are performing and the program they are supporting. In this way,
the signs are most like a list of donors in a symphony program.
These donors do not "speak" through the symphony program. In-
stead, they enjoy the benefit of the symphony's speech, recognizing
them as supporters.
The speech that occurs on Adopt-A-Highway signs is thus best
characterized as pure government speech, not as a govern-
ment/private speech interaction. The access that participants seek
is not to a speech forum, but to a government program that will
yield its recognition. The question then is what grounds the gov-
ernment can use to allocate participation in its nonspeech
program. Even though the private groups do not seek access to
government largesse to speak, the prohibition against viewpoint
discrimination in the distribution of government benefits applies. 77
The Klan's exclusions from Adopt-A-Highway programs on view-
point-based grounds then become instances where the government
374. See Missouri v. Cuffley, 927 E Supp. at 1252 ("In return [for their participation], the
participants receive recognition for their efforts through a sign provided by the Commission
acknowledging the identity of the group providing the work."); KKK v. Arkansas, 807 F. Supp. at
1431 (noting that the state will "[e]rect an identification sign on each end of the adopted
highway section to recognize the adopting organization's activities and efforts." (quoting the
Ark. State Highway & Transp. Dep't policy statement)).
375. See Missouri v. Cuffley, 927 E Supp. at 1252 ("The Commission recognizes that many of
the groups participating in the Program are motivated to participate in the Program by the
desire for publicity or 'free advertising,' in the case of commercial organizations; recognition
of their views in the case of political or social organizations; and even the desire to proselytize
for new members, in the case of religious organizations."); KKK v. Arkansas, 807 F. Supp. at
1430 ("Businesses, individuals, and other groups are permitted to adopt a section of highway
for the purpose of litter control and to receive Departmental recognition for their participa-
tion in the program." (quoting the Ark. State Highway & Transp. Dep't policy statement)).
376. See Missouri v. Cuffley, 927 E Supp. at 1255 (The state "and not the program partici-
pants, is responsible for erecting the sign at either end of the adopted stretch of highway and
... the participants have no control over the sign's content or format and may not include any
independent message on it.").
377. See Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972) (The government "may not deny a
benefit to a person on a basis that infringes his constitutionally protected interests-especially,
his interest in freedom of speech.").
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has imposed an unconstitutional condition on receipt of a gov-
ernment benefit.3 7 8 The conclusion that the government cannot
base program participation on the Klan's views remains the same
despite a grounding outside the free speech guarantee.
By contrast, New York City's program under which private
groups can request commemorative street renaming is a govern-
ment/private speech interaction in which the government
provides assistance for private speakers' expression. Commemora-
tive street signs supplement the street's primary designation and
are placed to recognize certain types of persons, places, or
events. 79 They may be created and placed by legislative action of
the city council, mayoral designation, or by the Department of
Transportation's (DOT's) grant of a private request. Private ap-
plicants propose both the sign's wording and its location.3 1 The
city creates the signs, which have a standard format, but when a
sign is placed pursuant to a private request, its cost and that of any
unveiling ceremony must be borne by the applicant.
3 2
The New York City dispute arose when the DOT denied the East
Timor Action Network's (ETAN's) requests for commemorative
street signs reading "1991 Santa Cruz Massacre" and "Free East
Timor.3 8 3 The DOT's reasons for denying the requests were that
the signs, to be placed near the Indonesian Consulate, were of a
"sensitive political nature," would "inflame the diplomatic commu-
nity," and impermissibly promoted a political party.384 But the City
had previously erected similarly "political" commemorative signs,
directed by the city council385 and the mayor,M6 and at the request
378. See Cuffley v. Mickes, 208 F.3d at 708 ("Requiring the Klan essentially to alter its mes-
sage of racial superiority and segregation ... would censor its message and inhibit its
constitutionally protected conduct.").
379. See East Timor Action Network v. City of New York, 71 E Supp. 2d 334, 338-39
(S.D.N.Y. 1999) (Temporary renaming of a street is permitted to commemorate "'a public
event of a not-for-profit nature, a cultural event, an event or person of historic significance, an
individual who has made a significant contribution to NewYorkers, [or] a community or public
service."' (quoting the Department of Transportation's Standard Operating Procedure 96-1)).
380. Id.
381. Id. at 340 (noting, for example, that the United Committee to Save Nigeria requested
street names, including Kudirat Abiola, the slain wife of a Nigerian dissident, to be posted near
the Nigerian Consulate).
382. Id. at 339.
383. Id. at 337.
384. Id. Despite denials, after ETAN's instigation of litigation, the Ciy agreed to erect a
temporary sign stating "East Timor Way" to avoid a hearing on a preliminary injunction. Id.
385. Id. at 340 ("In 1990, the City Council voted to name the street corner adjacent to the
Metropolitan Correctional Center as 'Joe Doherty Comer' after an admitted member of the
Irish Republican Army [who was being held there and was appealing an extradition order].").
386. Mayor Koch temporarily renamed comers near the appropriate consulates "Nelson
and Winnie Mandela Comer" and "Tiananmen Square Comer"; Mayor Giuliani renamed a
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of private parties. 3s7 The denial of ETAN's request thus depended
upon its viewpoint: Characterization of the program as govern-
ment or private speech therefore crucially determines its
constitutionality.
The question whether the program constitutes legitimate
government speech begins with the government's accountability.
General accountability requires that the government make clear
through its visible political process that it intends to speak through
the messages of private speakers s.3 9 This first requirement was what
was lacking in the New York City program. The program guidelines
did not acknowledge that the government would be making value
judgments among private speakers.390 Instead, DOT guidelines
established ostensibly subject matter-related grounds upon which
requests would be granted. This structure creates a private speech
forum.3 9' Additionally, the DOT did not even follow its own
guidelines. 92 For this reason, too, the government was not
generally accountable for its administration of the program.
The lack of general accountability invalidated this particular
commemorative sign program. Properly structured, however,
commemorative sign programs can be legitimate government
speech. In fact, some structural elements of the New York program
more appropriately placed it within the government speech cate-
gory. To the extent that the city council and the mayor determined
the designations, the resulting expression was pure government
speech. Many of these designations were politically controversial,
393
street near the Cuban mission as "Esquino Hermanos Al Rescate/Brothers to the Rescue Cor-
ner," in support of a Miami-based Cuban exile group dedicated to the overthrowing of Fidel
Castro. Id. at 339-40.
387. DOT approved "'Philippine Centennial Way' ... at the request of the Consulate
General of the Philippines" and "'Gretchen Dykstra Way' ... at the request of the Times
Square Business Improvement District". Id. at 340.
388. Id. at 347 ("Certain politically sensitive signs were permitted, and certain politically
sensitive signs were not permitted (sometimes for reasons having nothing to do with the
political sensitivity of the sign). Therefore, DOT engaged in constitutionally impermissible
viewpoint discrimination.").
389. See supra Part I.A.
390. East Timor Action Network, 71 F. Supp. 2d at 338.
391. See Nat'l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 586 (1998) (noting that
the government, in administering a private speech forum, "'encourage [s] a diversity of views
from private speakers"' and grants access according to "comparably objective decisions"
(quoting Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 834 (1995))).
392. East Timor Action Network, 71 F Supp. 2d at 346 n.5 ("[C]ity administrator routinely
ignore[d] the stated policy of his agency and ma[de] ad hoc final determinations that d[id]
not demonstrate any consistent approach.").
393. Mayor Giuliani's sign supporting a Cuban exile group "caused intense disputes, in-
cluding demonstrations, counter-demons-ations, protests, and at least one attempt to paint
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and the city's choices sent an identifiable message of the political
viewpoints it favored. The city can legitimately send this type of
message through the decisions of its elected bodies and officials,
and, because they are publicly accountable, the message may pro-
mote or disfavor particular viewpoints.
The city could also send this message through selected private
speakers. In fact, through its ad hoc administration of the sign
program, the DOT was apparently doing so, crafting its sign re-
quest decisions to send this same type of message promoting the
city's values.9 5 The great free speech danger, however, was that the
DOT's message-sending role was unstated, and in fact, mispor-
trayed. 396 Its viewpoint-based decisions therefore did not have the
democratic pedigree that would render them legitimate. Where
the government makes viewpoint-based decisions among private
speakers, political accountability is crucial.
Differently structured, a commemorative sign program could fall
into either of two categories of legitimate government speech.
First, private requesters could become government agents if the
program stated an objective to identify and adopt as government
speech messages that espouse the city's viewpoint. The chosen pri-
vate applicants would then "convey a governmental message."3 97 A
clearly stated program objective would satisfy the requirement of
general accountability.39' Because the speech occurs on govern-
ment signs on government property, which the viewing public
generally assumes that the government controls, additional infor-
mation to meet the requirement of specific accountability, such as
over the sign to erase its message." Id. at 340. The city council's designation of a corner to
recognize an IRA member prompted a letter from the British ambassador "expressing his
opposition to the legislation." Id.
394. Id. at 339 ("In the late 1980's, a portion of East 70th Street was renamed 'United
Jerusalem Place' to signify support for Israeli sovereignty over all of Jerusalem. Also in the
1980's, two areas near the United Nations were renamed in an effort to criticize the Soviet
Union.").
395. Id. at 340 ("DOT... denied a 1997 request from the National Council on Islamic
Affairs to erect four temporary street signs reading 'Yaser Arafat Way' at 44th Street and
Second Avenue in response to the designation by local law of Second Avenue between 42nd
and 43rd Streets, the block where the Israeli Consulate is located, as 'Yitzak Rabin Street.'").
396. Id. at 345 ("[T]he reason given by DOT for denying the Arafat sign was ... not
listed in the [policy statement] and patently false as a matter of practice...").
397. See Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 541 (2001) (quoting Rosenberger
v. Rector & Visitor of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995)).
398. See supra Part II.A. (discussing that the programmatic objective in Title X funding
to promote family planning alternatives other than abortion renders the government gener-
ally accountable for speech to fulfill this objective).
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an explicit statement of co-sponsorship on the street sign, would
in most circumstances not be required.4 0
Second, a differently structured program could also fall within
the quality arbiter government speech category. That the pro-
gram's purpose is to "promote" or "commemorate" certain events
or individuals establishes the groundwork for a legitimate quality
designation program. 41' To establish accountability for government
speech, however, the program would have to acknowledge that the
selection process will incorporate the city's viewpoint. One way to
do this is through the program's description. New York City's pro-
gram is described as if subject matter were the only restriction. 40 A
different description, phrased in terms like "excellence," "high
achievement," or "harmony with the city's values" would have to
make clear that other, potentially viewpoint-based considerations,
apply to each subject matter category and that the city would be
the entity applying them. Additionally, the decision-making process
would have to be one that could credibly and accountably deter-
mine the city's viewpoint. Vesting such decision making in an
403
administrative official alone, even one accountable to the mayor,
is insufficient to support a quality designation program. Creating
and charging some body with expertise to determine which re-
399. See Gentala v. City of Tuscon, 244 F3d 1065, 1073 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc), vacated
and remanded by 534 U.S. 946 (2001).
400. If the program, like New York City's, had at one time been structured as a private
speech forum, and the government sought to change this, some further action to make clear
its accountability for the viewpoints on the street signs might be required. Cf Capitol Square
Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 735, 776 (1995) (O'ConnorJ., concurring) (not-
ing that because of the display's proximity to the seat of government, where viewers might
reasonably assume government endorsement, disclaimer by government is important to
"make the State's role clear to the community").
401. See Nat'l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 589 (1998) (listing exam-
ples of "valuable Government programs" that depend upon "subjective criteria such as
'excellence,'" such as "the Congressional Award Program to 'promote initiative, achieve-
ment, and excellence among youths in the areas of public service, personal development,
and physical and expedition fitness'" (quoting 2 U.S.C. § 802 (1994)) and "funding to the
National Endowment for the Humanities to promote 'progress and scholarship in the hu-
manities'" (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 956(c)(1) (1994))).
402. All of the listed categories require judgment, which is necessarily somewhat subjec-
tive. For example, whether a particular individual "has made a significant contribution to
New Yorkers," East Timor Action Network v. City of New York, 71 E Supp. 2d 334, 339
(S.D.N.Y. 1999), is "to a certain extent a matter of degree and depends on the eye of the
beholder." See id. at 346 n.5 (making this observation with respect to "whether a sign is 'po-
litical"'). But this unavoidable subjectivity is not enough to advertise that the government is
making viewpoint-based judgments among private speakers. If the government wants the
protection of government speech in making its private speech selections, the burden is on it
to make clear its message-sending role. See supra Part II.A.
403. See East Timor Action Network, 71 F. Supp. 2d at 338.
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quests meet the "seal of approval" criteria, or providing a similar
type of review of an administrative official's decision,4°5 is required
to support the government's claim that it is administering a legiti-
mate quality designation program.
Another requirement of a legitimate quality designation pro-
gram is that it send an identifiable message. This means that the
program must be genuinely competitive. Having stated criteria is
one way to define the program's selectivity to send an identifiable406 • 407
message. Strict administration of the program is another. Both
of these must significantly narrow the importance of the seal of
approval so that it sends a meaningful message that goes beyond a
mere statement that the government dislikes the messages not in-
cluded.
One last concern in the context of street signs is dominance.
Street signs are exclusively controlled by the government and pro-
vide a potent means of expression. Arguably, there is no medium
quite like them. Still, if the government meets the other require-
ments of legitimate government speech in assisting private
speakers, it should be able to do so to the extent that it could speak
alone. The question, then, is whether the government would un-
constitutionally dominate the speech market if it were to create
commemorative street signs and determine their content without
private assistance. The answer seems to be that it would not. The
government would be using its significant resources to promote
what it values, but other ways for dissenters to promote alternate
values to the same audience would remain open. °s As long as the
government acknowledges its speech role in selecting private
speakers to do the same thing, the analysis should not vary. Thus,
properly structured, a commemorative sign program could consti-
tute legitimate quality arbiter government speech.
404. See Finley, 524 U.S. at 573 (noting that NEA grant applications are reviewed by ex-
pert advisory panels, then the 26-member National Council on the Arts, then the NEA
Chairperson). This elaborate level of expert input into the decision-making process is not
constitutionally required. Id. at 581. The type of expert review appropriate will vary accord-
ing to the context, but must be sufficient to demonstrate that the government is legitimately
applying "quality" criteria and not merely making ad hocjudgments.
405. See East Timor Action Network, 71 F Supp. 2d at 338 ("There is no process of review
of [the DOT official's] determinations.").
406. See Finley, 524 U.S. at 586 ("[T]he inherently content-based 'excellence' threshold
for NEA support sets it apart from the subsidy at issue in Rosenberger-which was available to
all student organizations that were "'related to the educational purpose of the Univer-
sity" '--and from comparably objective decisions on allocating public benefits...") (quoting
Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 834).
407. See id. at 585 (noting that the NEA "den[ies] the majority of the grant applications
that it receives").




States require that motorists purchase and post license plates on
their vehicles. The state normally determines the letter and num-
ber configurations that appear on each particular plate, as well as
the background outlay and motto that are common to all.09 The
conclusion that license plate speech is government speech was the
basis of the Court's holding that New Hampshire could not consti-
tutionally require a private motorist to "use [his] private property
as a 'mobile billboard' for the State's ideological message. 41 0 Now,
however, the tables have turned. Rather than forcing a state mes-
sage on private motorists, many states offer drivers the option of
selecting their own letter/number configuration or background
outlay and motto. Motorists pay an extra fee to purchase the cus-
tom plates so that they can convey a private message through the
publicly issued plates. The result, again, is a mixture of govern-
ment and private speech. And, to determine whether the scope of
the government's discretion to select among messages that it will
print, distribute and allow on its roadways, the relevant question is:
who's talking?
States allow motorists to choose the information on their license
plates pursuant to two different types of programs. The first type of
program allows motorists to choose their letter/number configura-
tion, thereby creating an individualized "vanity" plate.41 ' The extra
funds raised from this type of program usually go to the state
treasury generally or to a designated state fund. 12 The second type
of program allows groups to apply to the state to manufacture and
offer for purchase by individual motorists a number of "specialty"
plates with the same background outlay and motto, which adver-
tises the group or its cause.' 3 Funds raised from this type of
program are usually split between the state and the organization or
cause portrayed on the plate."'
With each type of program, disputes have arisen when states
have made some messages available on license plates but not
409. See, e.g., Denial of the Application for the Custom Plates "WINE" "INVINO"
"VINO" of Michael Paul Higgins v. Driver & Motor Vehicle Servs. Branch, 13 P.3d 531, 532
(Ore. Ct. App. 2000) (en banc).
410. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 715 (1977).
411. See, e.g., CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 13, § 170.00 (2000).
412. See id.
413. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ch. 320.08053 (2000) (Florida law states that organizations may
apply for specialty plates).
414. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ch. 320.08056(7) (2000).
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others. A number of courts have ordered states to manufacture
and deliver to motorist applicants both vanity"4 5 and specialty
plates,416 finding that the states' denials of the requests were
unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination in a private speech
forum. Other courts, however, have upheld such denials.4 17 The
Oregon Court of Appeals recently did so, explicitly basing its
decision on a finding that both vanity and specialty license plates
constitute government speech.418
The correct conclusion is that, as currently run, both vanity and
specialty plate programs are private speech forums. Neither consti-
tutes legitimate government speech because both accountability
and an identifiable message are lacking. Because of differences in
the types of programs, it is necessary to separately discuss their
specifics.
Vanity plate programs lack accountability and an identifiable
message both because of their structure and administration. Vanity
plate programs are typically created by a state's legislature, but ad-
ministered by an executive agency, such as the department of
motor vehicles.4 19 The act creating the program usually states that
applicants may obtain the configuration of their choice so long as
its meaning does not fall within certain listed categories. Applica-
tions are routinely granted unless they fall within one of the
prohibited categories.42 The apparent purposes of the programs
415. See, e.g., Pruitt v. Wilder, 840 F Supp. 414, 418 (E.D. Va. 1994) (holding that Vir-
ginia cannot deny "GODZGUD" vanity plate); Dimmick v. Quigley, No. C96-3987 (N.D. Cal.
July 14, 1998) (discussed extensively in Dimmick v. Lungren, No. C98-4137 SI, 1999 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 2228, (N.D. Cal. Feb. 17, 1999) (holding that California cannot deny "HIV POS"
vanity plate)).
416. See, e.g., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc. v. Glendening, 954 E Supp. 1099, 1104
(D. Md. 1997) (holding that Maryland cannot recall specialty plates with Confederate flag
logo).
417. See, e.g., Kahn v. Dep't of Motor Vehicles, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 6,13 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993;
Katzv v Dep't of Motor Vehicles, 108 Cal. Rptr. 424,429 (Cal. Ct. App. 1973).
418. Denial of the Application for the Custom Plates "WINE" "INVINO" "VINO" of Mi-
chael Paul Higgins v. Driver & Motor Vehicle Servs. Branch, 13 P.3d 531, 534 (Ore. Ct. App.
2000) (en banc) ("We believe that the proper course is to view the communication that
occurs on state license plates, including custom plates, as state communication rather than
as communication by the plate holders or a combination of both.").
419. See, e.g., CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 13, § 170.00 (2000).
420. See, e.g., CAL. VEH. CODE § 5105(a) (Deering 2001) (forbidding any combination
"that may carry connotations offensive to good taste and decency or which would be mis-
leading.");Judy Fahys, State's Tag Team Tries to Keep It Tasteful, THE SALT LAKE TRIB., Oct. 17,
1999, at Al (Utah's Division of Motor Vehicles Director says, as to vanity plate applications,
"We try to be as accommodating as possible"); Bill Montgomery, That's Not Funny: State Keeps
Lid on what License Plates Spell, THE ATLANTA J. & CoNsT., Dec. 26, 1997, at lID ("[M]ore
than 110,350 'prestige' plates were issued [in Georgia] from 1990 to the end of 1996...";




are to allow private expression and to make money. States do not
claim to endorse the approved plates, although some state officials
have argued, in support of denying certain applications, that other
motorists might incorrectly assume that they do So.42' This structure
does not render the government accountable for speaking through
its private speech selections. Neither does it send any affirmative
message. Rather, the result of the program is roadways full of
unique letter/number combinations that represent the private
choices of the vehicle owners and are understood as such by other
drivers. Vanity plate programs thus constitute private speech
forums.
Specialty license plate programs are structured somewhat differ-
ently. Rather than an administrative agency, it is often the
legislature that passes upon each application as it would on a piece1 22
of legislation. Guidelines for applications set out the require-
ments, which usually relate to subject matter, speaker status, or
projected profitability.42 3 Sometimes, however, they acknowledge
potential viewpoint-based discretion in the legislature's decision-
424making process. Arguably, however, such an explicit acknowl-
edgment that the legislature's decisions may depend upon
viewpoints is not required, because these types of decisions are in-
herent to the legislative process.425 Because decision-making
authority exists directly in the legislature, the legislature is ac-
countable for its specialty plate application decisions as it would be
for any other piece of legislation. So, in contrast to vanity plate
programs, the government is generally accountable for making
421. See FrankJ. Prial, Wine Talk, N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 1997, at C8 (noting that an admin-
istrative law judge accepted the state officials' argument that a wine-related vanity plate
"could convey the message that the state condones the use of alcoholic beverages by driv-
ers").
422. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ch. 320.08053 (2000); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. TIT. 29 § 468 (West
2000); MIss. CODE ANN. § 27-19-44 (2001).
423. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ch. 320.08053(b)-(d) (Florida requires applicant groups to
submit results of a scientific survey showing that at least 15,000 motor vehicle owners intend
to purchase the proposed plate, an application fee of approximately $60,000, and a market-
ing strategy outlining short-term and long-term marketing plans for the plate).
424. See e.g., Sen. Tom Lee, Controversy over 'Choose Life' License Plate Misses Whole Point of
Choice, THE PALM BEACH POST, May 19, 1998, at 15A (stating that "the Senate has imposed
nine policy questions to ensure that the [proposed] license plate serves a broad public pur-
pose"; these criteria "protect Floridians from those who might attempt to use the specialty
license plate statute to advertise a negative fringe idea.").
425. See Leslie GielowJacobs, Free Speech and the Limits of Legislative Discretion: The Example
of Specialty License Plates, 53 FLA. L. REv. 419, 464-65 (2001) ("The ability, and perhaps obli-
gation, of legislators to pass on individual applications as they pass on other pieces of
legislation ... means that viewpoint considerations will almost certainly enter into some
decision making.").
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viewpoint-based decisions among private speakers with respect to
specialty license plate programs administered by legislatures.
What is lacking, however, is an identifiable message. Specialty li-
cense plate programs do not express an intent to adopt the
approved messages as the government's own. To the extent that a
state may later argue this intent with respect to a particular plate,
the existence of a wide range of other plates approved without any
apparent intent to adopt all of the messages belies this purpose
with respect to one of them. Nor can the legislature plausibly claim
to be an editor with the discretion to select and present the spe-
cialty plates that it chooses. The legislature does not view itself as
crafting a presentation when it passes upon specialty plate applica-
tions, and is accountable to no one in doing so.
The most likely possibility is that specialty license plate programs
could send the message of a quality designation program. Approval
guidelines that incorporate subjective criteria lay this groundwork.
Missing in the current programs, however, is the competitive proc-
ess that would make a state's claim to be sending a quality arbiter
message credible. To be sure, not all plate applications are ap-
proved. Plates with powerful sponsors make it through the
legislative gauntlet, while those with powerful opponents are
"killed" at some stage before they are signed into law.42 6 Because of
the need for majority legislative support, many groups may not
even bother to apply. But this type of competition is purely politi-
cal. It does not reflect the detached effort to evaluate applicants
according to established criteria and to endorse them as meeting
the standard, as government quality designation speech requires.
Unlike vanity plate programs, which almost inevitably will consti-
tute primarily private speech, it would be possible to structure a
specialty plate program to be legitimate government speech. A
state could announce in its program an intent to adopt approved
plate messages as its own. The private applicants would then be-
come government agents in promoting the plates. A state could
also hold a genuine competition for plate designs or mottos, with
articulated criteria and a body with expertise to make the deci-
sions. The approval process could then constitute government seal
of approval speech.
As with street signs, the question of dominance could arise since
license plate speech may be exclusively controlled by the state. But,
426. See e.g., Tom Humphrey, Sundquist Assails "Neanderthal Thinking"; Says Reform Opposi-
tion May Lose Seats, KNOXVILLE NEWS-SENTINEL, Oct. 15, 1999, at A3 (stating that the
Calendar Committee "killed" a bill for a Confederate flag logo specialty plate after several
African-American legislators objected to it).
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even more clearly than street signs, alternate avenues for commu-
nication exist, like bumper stickers and even license plate
holders.4 2 7 The government may speak on license plates without
dominating the relevant speech market. The fact that it allows pri-
vate input does not change the dominance inquiry.
C. Advertising
Private advertising that occurs on government property gener-
ally is not government speech. In most situations, the government
solicits advertising to support its nonspeech operations. The gov-
ernment's purpose in soliciting the advertisements is to make
money, not to send a message.42s Consequently, the structure and
administration of the program neither render the government ac-
countable for speaking through its speech selections nor send an
identifiable message. Instead, the advertising program is a private
speech forum, which means that the government cannot allocate
access according to the speakers' viewpoints.4
A closer question arises when the government solicits private fi-
nancial support for its own speech activity, and acknowledges the
support in a way that advertises the sponsor. One specific dispute
arose when the Ku Klux Klan sought to underwrite several seg-
ments of National Public Radio's "All Things Considered" to be
broadcast by the public broadcasting radio station KWMU. The
station rejected the Klan's underwriting application, explaining
that the required acknowledgment of the Klan's financial assis-
tance would "result in a significant loss of revenue" to the
427. See Kahn v. Dep't of Motor Vehicles, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 6, 11-12 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993)
(stating that applicant denied vanity license plate configuration "remains free to express the
same sentiment on her vehicle by using a bumper sticker, license plate holder or similar
medium.").
428. See, e.g., Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 304 (1974) (holding that,
in leasing car cards for its rapid transit vehicles, the city acts "in a proprietary capacity"); N.Y.
Magazine v. Metro. Transp. Auth., 136 F.3d 123, 125 (2d Cir. 1998) (noting that Metropoli-
tan Transit Authority "raises revenue for its operation, in part, by leasing advertising space
on the buses.").
429. See N.Y Magazine, 136 F.3d at 130 (holding that advertising on the outside of city
buses is a private speech forum); Christ's Bride Ministries, Inc. v. Southeastern Pa. Transp.
Auth., 148 F.3d 242, 255 (3d Cir. 1998) (subway advertisements create private speech fo-
rum); United Food & Commercial Workers Union, Local 1099 v. Southwest Ohio Reg'l
Transit Auth., 163 F.3d 341, 355 (6th Cir. 1998) (holding that bus advertising creates a pri-
vate speech forum).
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university on whose campus KWMU operated. 430 The Klan, sup-
ported by the American Civil Liberties Union, argued that the
underwriting program was essentially an advertising sales program
and, as such, was a private speech forum.4 1 Rejecting its sponsor-
ship because of the potentially adverse listener reaction was thus
unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination.4 2
Under one view, adopted in the alternative by the district court
in Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. Bennett, it is not necessary to char-
acterize the underwriting program as government speech to
uphold the station's discretion because its reason for rejecting the
Klan's underwriting application was "based upon [uncontradicted]
business and economic reasons" and did not constitute an attempt
to suppress the group's viewpoint. 413 This conclusion is incorrect
and illustrates the great free speech danger that exists when the
government acts with an economic motivation in choosing among
private speakers.
The Seventh Circuit addressed a similar claim by the govern-
ment that its ostensibly viewpoint-based decision was permissibly
economically motivated. The Illinois government unit that owned
and operated Navy Pier in Chicago cited "favorable publicity" as its
reason for waiving rental fees for the 1996 Democratic National
Convention but not for a group advocating an increase in the
minimum wage.3 4 The court rejected this ground as an unconstitu-
tional "form of the heckler's veto." 3 5 Although the government's





Relying on public reaction as the basis for allocating access to a
private speech forum thus constitutes impermissible viewpoint dis-
crimination in almost all circumstances. 37 It certainly did in the




433. 29 E Supp. 2d 576, 586 (E.D. Mo. 1998), aff'd, 203 F.3d 1090 (8th Cir. 2000).
434. Chicago ACORN, SEIU Local No. 880 v. Metro. Pier & Exposition Auth., 150 E3d
695, 699 (7th Cir. 1998) ("The act of largesse that set off this suit-the rental of the entire
pier to the Democratic Party for $1-was motivated, we are assured ... not by any fealty to
the Democrats but by the enormous and on the whole favorable publicity that the event was
expected to generate for the pier.").
435. Id. at 701 ("[I]t would be the equivalent of charging a higher permit fee for a
march or other demonstration by an unpopular group on the ground that the onlookers are
likely to be hostile, thus necessitating increased security; and that is forbidden.").
436. Id. ("The motive is innocent, but the discriminatory effect too great to be permit-
ted.").
437. But see Ark. Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 681 (1998) (holding
that it is permissible to limit candidate debate to frontrunners); Leslie GielowJacobs, The
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case of KWMU's denial of the Klan's application to underwrite the
NPR programming. All of the reasons related directly to listeners'
reactions to the Klan's racist views. Unlike the Forbes candidate de-
bate, where space was scarce and speaker popularity was arguably
relevant to its purpose, neither of these justifications for excluding
the Klan apply. The radio station's ability to exclude the Klan from
the underwriting program therefore depended upon characteriz-
ing it as government speech.438
The Eighth Circuit characterized the underwriting acknowl-
edgments as government speech 43 9 and, although it is a close
question, the characterization is correct. The court, however, in-
termixed two different grounds for labeling the program
government speech. It is necessary to disentangle the two because
only one of them supports the court's further conclusion that re-
jecting the Klan's sponsorship was valid.
The first ground for labeling the underwriting acknowledgment
program as government speech is the same as for placing that label
on the government's acknowledgment of Adopt-A-Highway assis-
tance. It is not the underwriters who speak; it is the government
that speaks by acknowledging its sources of financial assistance.
The line between acknowledgment and advertising is finer in the
public radio programming underwriting context than with high-
way signs because the station's guidelines allow certain "collateral
information" about the sponsor to be included in the 15-second
acknowledgment spot."0 But even assuming that the acknowledg-
ments can be labeled as this type of government speech, the
constitutional inquiry does not end. As with highway signs, the
government generally may not condition access to a benefit on the
applicant's viewpoint. If the program is simply one to solicit private
support to defray the government's costs of providing a public ser-
vice, the prohibition on viewpoint discrimination would apply.
Because the radio station's reason for rejecting the Klan's applica-
tion was its viewpoint, characterizing the acknowledgment
program as this type of "pure" government speech does not legiti-
mate the exclusion.
The second ground for labeling the selection of acknowledg-
ments government speech is the crucial one. This is that, even in
Public Sensibilities Forum, 95 Nw. U. L. REv. 1357, 1408-28 (2001) (arguing that it is permissi-
ble to impose some public sensibilities standards in certain nonpublic forums).
438. Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. Bennett, 29 F. Supp. 2d 576, 586 (E.D. Mo. 1998).
439. Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. Curators of the Univ. of Mo., 203 F.3d 1085, 1093
(8th Cir. 2000).
440. See id. at 1094 n.9.
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choosing its sponsors, the radio station was acting as an editor, com-
piling private speech in a way that constituted a unique government
communication. A government editor can make viewpoint-based
decisions among private speakers because, by doing so, the editor is
crafting its own valuable communication.441 So, if the choice of un-
derwriters falls within the radio station's editorial discretion, it can
exclude the Klan because of its viewpoint.
The station's choice of programming is at the heart of its edito-
rial discretion. The station is accountable for its programming,
both to the public generally and to its listeners. Through its pro-
gramming, it sends an identifiable message. But whether a public
radio station's more peripheral choice of underwriters falls within
the scope of its discretion to make viewpoint-based decisions is a
closer question.
Both whether the station is accountable and whether it sends an
identifiable message in its selection of underwriters depends upon
the structure and administration of the program, as well as com-
mon public understandings about whether radio stations "speak"
through their selections of underwriters. The structure of under-
writing programs suggests that the choice of underwriters is subject
to the station's discretion in the same way as programming. That
underwriters can choose the particular programs that they want to
sponsor suggests a connection between them and the program,
which, in turn, supports placing them within the sphere of the edi-
tor's discretion. The administration of the programs will vary by
station. A history of open access followed by a single rejection
would raise the targeting concern. A pattern that showed an exer-
cise of judgment would support placing it within the station's
discretion.
Public understandings may vary, and can be changed by disclo-
sures. Nevertheless, government broadcasters receive their
discretion by analogy to private speakers, who can use both their
programming and their choice of support to communicate their
viewpoints. The most common public understanding is probably
that public radio stations may exercise discretion in choosing their
sponsors.
Finally, public broadcasters receive broad discretion because
they operate under a public trust, and because it serves free speech
values for them to be able to communicate free from judicial over-
sight and private claims of access. This consideration, too, supports
a finding that public broadcasters' choices of underwriters is gov-
ernment editorial speech.
441. See id. at 1094.
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All of these considerations confirm that a public broadcaster's
choice of underwriters can be legitimate government speech,
whereas advertising in public places generally is not. The crucial
difference is that the government creates public broadcasters for
the purpose of speaking. Their choice of entities to support their
operations thus is more closely connected to a government mes-
sage than is the government's choice of private entities to support
its nonspeech operations.
D. Public-Private Events
Other government/private speech interactions involve
government efforts to promote community interests by assisting
private speakers. These programs uncomfortably straddle the private
and government speech categories. The speech that occurs comes
from private speakers, and, as in a private speech forum, the
government often encourages wide private participation to fulfill
its objectives. At the same time, the government does not
encourage a full diversity of views, because it imposes standards
designed to fulfill its community promotion purposes. While this
greater selectivity might mean only that the government's forum is
nonpublic rather than more open, a constitutional question arises
when the government's criteria are subjective enough to allow for
viewpoint-based decisions. In these instances, it is necessary to
determine who's talking.
One example is the City of Tucson's Civic Events Fund.442 The




Sponsors of events to occur in the City's parks could apply to the
Subcommittee for Civic Events for payment of the cost of sound
and lighting equipment, booths and tables, and clean-up services,
which were otherwise available for a rental fee. 4 The City's "Civic
Event Policy Statement and Evaluation Criteria" defined the events
that it would support as those that: "'celebrate and commemorate
the historical, cultural and ethnic heritage of the City and the
442. Gentala v. City of Tucson, 244 F.3d 1065 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc), vacated and re-
manded, 534 U.S. 946 (2001) (on Establishment Clause grounds.).
443. Id. at 1068.
444. Id. at 1069 ("When such financial support is approved, ... the City (with limited
exceptions) does not provide any money directly to the event's sponsors. The city depart-
ment that would ordinarily bill the event's sponsors instead bills and receives payment from
the Fund.").
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nation, or increase the community's knowledge and understanding
of critical issues ... [;] generate broad community appeal and
participation[;] instill civic pride in the City, state, or nation[;]
contribute to tourism[;] or are identified as unique community
events.' 045 It further specified that the events must be conducted
"on a non-profit basis," that the events must be open to the public
and nondiscriminatory, and that the sponsors must maintain
liability insurance and provide a proper accounting.446 Sponsors of
events that receive funding were required to promise to publicize
the City's contribution of services in their advertising and
announce it during the event.
447
The Policy also precluded from participating in the Fund
-events held in direct support of religious organizations.' ,,s Be-
cause of this exclusion, organizers of the 1997 Tucson National Day
of Prayer did not receive funding.449 This meant that, although the
event occurred in a city park as planned, afterwards the event or-
ganizers were required to pay approximately $340 for city-provided
equipment and services. 450 The organizers argued, plausibly, that
the religious exclusion constituted viewpoint discrimination. 51
Therefore, to evaluate its validity under the Free Speech Clause,
determining whether the program constituted some type of legiti-
mate government speech was crucial.
Another example of a "public-private partnership" event is the
CowParade, an exhibit that consists of approximately 500 life-size
decorated cow sculptures.4 2 CowParade is a private organization
that collaborates with cities to run the event. 453 CowParade event
454organizers solicit private businesses in the city to "adopt" a cow.
445. Id. at 1068.
446. Id. at 1068-69.
447. Id.
448. Id. at 1069.
449. See id. at 1067.
450. Id. at 1068 (stating that the chair of the Prayer Committee applied for $340 in
support from the Fund for lighting and sound equipment and services).
451. See Good News Club v. Milford Cent. School, 533 U.S. 98, 107 (2001).
452. People for Ethical Treatment of Animals v. Giuliani, 105 E Supp. 2d 294, 298
(S.D.N.Y. 2000). "Mayor Giuliani observed that the CowParade is a 'unique public-private
partnership.'" Id. at 299 (quoting Decl. Of Sean Gifford in Support of PETA's Motion for
Preliminary Injunction, sworn to May 31, 2000, Ex. E).
453. Id. at 298, 299 n.4 (CowParade organizers in New York were CowParade, LLC,
CowParade Holdings Corp., CowParade NYC 2000, Inc., together with Velocity Sports and
Entertainment, LLC, operating under an assignment of permit from CowParade Worldwide;
CowParade has also occurred in Zurich, Switzerland and Chicago.).
454. Id. at 298 ("Individuals and groups, in particular 'every corporation, restaurant,
hotel and/or retailer in New York,' were solicited by the CowParade Organizers to become
'patrons,' or sponsors, of CowParade by 'adopting' a cow to be displayed as part of the
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Such patrons pay a fee and select the cow's design either by choos-
ing from those held by the organizers or by commissioning an
artist to create one.455 The cows are then placed on display
throughout the city in highly visible public and private places. 56
According to CowParade's promotional literature, cities benefit
from the favorable publicity generated by the event, as well as fi-
nancially from increased tourism. Cities also share in the
proceeds of merchandise sales and the cow auction that occurs
4581when the event terminates.
CowParade New York City 2000 occurred in the summer of that
year. CowParade solicited sponsors and, pursuant to the agreement
between the organizers and the city, a committee jointly composed
of City and CowParade representatives reviewed the cow designs
proposed in sponsorship applications. The submission guidelines
established by the committee prohibited designs that were
"'religious, political or sexual in nature,'" or that contained "cor-
porate logos or advertisements.
46
0
A dispute arose when the Committee rejected one of two cow
designs submitted by People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals
(PETA). 465' The rejected design divided the cow into butcher shop
cuts, each of which contained a quotation "'concerning the health
and ethical problems associated with the killing of cows for
food.' ' '462 The Committee objected to three of the proposed
event." (quoting Decl. Of Sean Gifford in Support of PETA's Motion for Preliminary Injunc-
tion, sworn to May 31, 2000, Ex. A at 2)).
455. Id.
456. Id. at 299 ("The decorated cow sculptures ... are presently located in a wide vari-
ety of highly visible public and private areas throughout the City, including parks, sidewalks,
building plazas and train stations.").
457. Id. ("CowParade in Chicago was 'viewed by more than 10 million people and gen-
erated more than $500 million in additional tourism revenue.'" (quoting Decl. Of Sean
Gifford in Support of PETA's Motion for Preliminary Injunction, sworn to May 31, 2000, Ex.
E)).
458. Id.
459. Id. The permit signed between organizers and the City provides for a committee
that "'shall establish guidelines for submission of work for display in the Exhibition, and will
evaluate artists' work in light of the submission guidelines.'" Id. (quoting Deel. Of City, Ex. B
at§ 1).
460. Id. at 300.
461. The design approved by the Committee consisted of a cow covered with artificial
leather products, with the motto, "'buy fake for the COW'S sake.'" Id. (quoting Decl. Of
Sean Gifford in Support of PETA's Motion for Preliminary Injunction, sworn to May 31,
2000, Ex. C).
462. Id. (quoting Compl. at 29, Decl. Of Sean Gifford in Support of PETA's Motion
for Preliminary Injunction, sworn to May 31, 2000, Ex. D).
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quotations as "inappropriate,"46 given the "festive, whimsical and
decorous entertainment" the exhibit was intended to achieve,464
but advised PETA that it could submit a modified design with the
quotations removed. 65 PETA did not do so, but instead sued,
arguing that the rejection was unconstitutionally viewpoint• • • 466
discriminatory. Even if the district court were correct in rejecting
this claim,467 the case raises the more general question of the scope
of a government's ability to be selective when it puts on an event of
this sort. This, in turn, requires determining whether the event
constituted legitimate government speech.
Accountability is the first requirement of legitimate government
speech. In both examples, the cities were accountable for speaking.
The Tucson standards were democratically enacted and publicly
visible.4 6 The City prominently identified its association with cho-
469sen events, satisfying the specific accountability requirement.
Similarly, New York City was accountable for hosting the Cow-
Parade. City officials signed the contract establishing the event and
participated in its administration. 470 The City widely publicized its
463. Id. at 301. ("The Committee had found that while most of the statements included
in the second cow were acceptable, three statements in three panels were not: 'A lot of times
the man skinning the cow finds out an animal is still conscious.'-USDA Inspector Timothy
Walker[;] Cattle are castrated and dehorned without anesthesia[.;] Eating meat causes im-
potence because it blocks the arteries to all vital organs, including the penis.-Dr. Dean
Ornish, Medical Advisor to President Clinton[]" Id. The committee "saw the design as in-
appropriate. [It] perceived it as overtly and aggressively political in that it was too graphic
and violent for a public display that was to be installed in public parks, on public streets, and
on school property, where the public at large of all ages would encounter it without having
sought it out." Id. (quoting Aff. of David Slarskey, attached to the City Decl., sworn to June
20, 2000, ati 14)).
464. Id. at 323.
465. Id. at 302.
466. Id. at 333.
467. The district court found the CowParade to constitute a nonpublic forum, id. at
319, but found the PETA cow's rejection to be viewpoint neutral, id. at 334. It did not di-
rectly confront the issue of whether the CowParade could constitute legitimate government
speech, although it did rely upon Finley to find the CowParade's subjective guidelines rea-
sonable. Id. at 322.
468. Gentala v. City of Tuscon, 244 F.3d 1065, 1069 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc), vacated
and remanded by 534 U.S. 946 (2001) (noting that the Civic Events Fund "consist[s] of mon-
eys appropriated from [the city's] general coffers and derived from tax revenues, among
other sources"; "The Fund application and a document entitled 'Civic Event Fund Policy
Statement and Evaluation Criteria' spell out the criteria for funding in great detail.").
469. Id. (The City's contribution was acknowledged in pre-event publicity and an an-
nouncement during the event).
470. PETA, 105 E Supp. 2d at 299, 304 (noting the existence of a "contractual agree-
ment between the City and the CowParade Organizers" and participation of city
representatives on the design review committee).
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association with the event,47' and a majority of the cow sculptures
were placed on government property.472 These factors meet both
general and specific accountability requirements.
The primary question with respect to both events is whether they
sent an identifiable message that allowed the government to use
potentially viewpoint-discriminatory criteria when making its pri-
vate speech selections. To determine the specific requirements of
an identifiable message, it is necessary to identify under what cate-
gory of government speech the events are potentially legitimate.
Because these programs occur for the purpose of making private
speech available to the public, neither constitutes speech by gov-
ernment agents. The available categories are those of government
editor or government quality arbiter. While similar, the categories
differ in that a government editor's message emerges after it exer-
cises discretion to compile various private messages into a unique
whole, whereas a government quality arbiter sends a message
through each private selection by branding it as meeting preestab-
lished, subjective criteria.
Although the two community interest programs are similar in
some respects, differences in their details place them in different
government speech categories. The City of Tucson's selection of
private entities to receive payment for services from its Civic Events
Fund is best characterized as an attempt to engage in quality arbi-
ter government speech, rather than as speech of a government
editor. Its structure contained preestablished, subjective standards
and a mechanism for evaluating each application for conformance
to them. The City advertised its sponsorship of each event as it oc-
curred, thereby sending individualized messages of endorsement.
The City did not express an intent that the public view the spon-
sored events as a whole; it did not advertise the events together for
the purpose of creating a combined public impression, and so rea-
sonable viewers would probably not perceive a unified message.
For these reasons, the City could not claim the discretion of a gov-
ernment editor to craft its message through the selection process.
Instead, it was required to identify its message as an endorsement
that the chosen private speech met the preestablished criteria.
The identifiability of an endorsement message comes both from
the stated selection criteria and the administration of the program.
471. Id. at 299. A CowParade press release quoted Mayor Giuliani's observation that
event is a "unique public-private partnership". Id.
472. Id. at 299 n.3 (About 366 of the approximately 500 cow sculptures accepted in the
exhibit were allowed to be place on public property).
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The stated selection criteria for the CiviciEvents Fund articulated
the affirmative characteristics sought, called for subjective judg-
ment, and represented plausible bases for the City's quality
endorsement. It is then the administration of the program that is
crucial.
Like its stated criteria, the established administrative process is,
as described and followed, sufficient to support a government qual-
ity arbiter program. A subcommittee administered the Tucson
program, accepting applications and evaluating them against the
established standards to arrive at a funding determination. 73 Such
a system is a credible means to provide coherent application of the
established standards and so to render meaningful the endorse-
ment message sent by each approved event.
The primary issue with the Civic Events Fund program is that it
was not particularly competitive. Out of 26 applications for the one
year with complete information in the record, 23 were funded.474
This may suggest that the subjective access standards do not actu-
ally result in a meaningful statement of endorsement.4 15 In this
case, the Fund would be a private speech forum.4 7 6 However, an ab-
solute numbers comparison can be deceptive. Self-selection is the
477
likely result of published application criteria, which then presents
an inaccurate picture of the relevant applicant "pool."
If the program's administration otherwise meets the require-
ments of legitimate government speech, the more relevant inquiry
is whether the pattern of rejected applications suggest invidious
targeting.4 78 For the year on record, the rejected applications for
the Humane Society-sponsored Fun Day in the Park, the Sister Cit-
ies Fund Raiser, and the Casa Car Show479 do not suggest a
viewpoint discriminatory pattern. The claim of the Prayer Day or-
ganizers, however, would be that the religious exclusion included
473. Gentala v. City of Tuscon, 244 E3d 1065, 1068 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc), vacated
and remanded by 534 U.S. 946 (2001).
474. Id. at 1069.
475. See Nat'l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 586 (1998) (stating that
the "competitive process" sets NEA funding apart from private speech forums in which the
government "indiscriminately 'encourage[s] a diversity of views from private speakers."'
(quoting Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 834 (1995))).
476. See id.
477. See id. at 589 (recognizing "as a practical matter, that artists may conform their
speech to what they believe to be the decision-making criteria in order to acquire fund-
ing.").
478. See id. at 587 ("[E]ven in the provision of subsidies, the Government may not
'ai [m] at the suppression of dangerous ideas.'" (quoting Regan v. Taxation With Represen-
tation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 550 (1983) (quoting Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S.
498, 513 (1959) (quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 519 (1958))))).
479. Gentala, 244 F.3d at 1070.
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in the guidelines impermissibly targets their viewpoint. If the Civic
Events Fund were a private speech forum, the organizers' claim
that the exclusion constitutes viewpoint discrimination could be
correct.4s But the targeting inquiry is more narrow, asking whether
the government has identified particular disliked viewpoints for
disfavor. Here, the City has plausible reasons unrelated to dislike of
religious viewpoints for failing to endorse them through its Civic
411Events Fund. Other exclusions written into the guidelines and
imposed in practice further dispel an impression that the govern-
ment is targeting religious speech for suppression. 82 All of these
considerations suggest that the City engaged in legitimate quality
arbiter speech when it selected private speakers to subsidize from
its Civic Events Fund, and so its exclusion of the Prayer Day event
from funding did not violate the Free Speech Clause.483
By contrast to the City of Tucson in its Fund administration, New
York City is best characterized as having acted as an editor when it
approved and presented sculptures in its CowParade. Unlike the
Civic Events Fund, the CowParade review process was not struc-
tured to identify individual applications that met affirmatively
stated criteria of excellence or community interest. 4 4 Rather, it was
structured to identify those submissions that clashed with the City's
intended "festive and whimsical" theme.48 ' The City did not send a
message of endorsement through each cow. Instead, consistent
with its designation as a "parade," the message of decorated cows
comes from their combined effect.
48 6
That the City acted as an editor rather than a quality arbiter re-
quires a different analysis of whether it sent an identifiable
480. See Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 108-09 (2001) (holding
that the exclusion of a religious student group from the use of school facilities constitutes
viewpoint discrimination).
481. The city's purpose was to avoid violating the Establishment Clause. Gentala, 244
F.3d at 1068. Though it refused to fund events that raised money for religious entities, it
funded events held by religiously-affiliated organizations that did not directly benefit the
groups, as well as events held by secular organizations with religious themes. Id. at 1071-72.
482. Id. at 1068 (stating that only nonprofit events will be funded).
483. Gentala v. City of Tuscon, 213 E3d 1055, 1076 (Pregerson,J., dissenting), vacated by
244 E3d 1065 (9th Cir. 2001).
484. People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v. Giuliani, 105 F. Supp. 2d 294, 299-
300 (S.D.N.Y 2000) ("'[T]he Commissioned Artist is encouraged to be creative with his or
her Commissioned Design, but to remember that the audience will be broad-based and of
all ages.'" (quoting Guidelines and Approval Process for Commissioned Designs)).
485. Id. at 300 ("'Commissioned Designs that are religious, political or sexual in nature
will not be accepted .... '" (quoting Guidelines and Approval Process for Commissioned
Designs)).
486. See id. at 299 (Mayor Giuliani observed that the event "give [s] visitors and residents
one more reason to explore the boroughs").
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message that would legitimize its governmental speech. Again, the
structure and administration of the event are relevant. The ques-
tion is whether they confirm that the compilation of private
speakers is a unified speech act to which the protections of edito-
rial discretion should apply. In this case, they did. The event was
structured as an exhibit of multiple sculptures which, in combina-
tion, would interest and attract viewers. It was to take place during
a set period of time, during which all private components would be
simultaneously on display. 48 7 Built into its structure was a means for
the organizers to exercise judgment with respect to the content of
private submissions, and they indeed did so.
As with Tucson's Civic Events Fund, an issue with respect to the
CowParade was the actual lack of competition among entrants. All
but four submissions were approved. 48s But, again, the guidelines
likely induced self-selection among applicants. Consequently, the
question is whether, in rejecting PETA's application, the City was
targeting its point of view. Both the pattern of other rejections and
its pinpointed rejection of particular quotes within the PETA sub-
mission suggest that the City was not targeting its point of view. s9
Its claim to be pursuing a "whimsical" theme and its committee
method for passing on submissions confirm this. For these reasons,
the City acted legitimately as a government editor in putting to-
gether its CowParade.
These two examples of legitimate community promotion of gov-
ernment speech as editor and quality arbiter demonstrate how fine
the line is between these categories and private speech forums.
Subjective standards that allow for viewpoint discrimination among
private speakers are impermissible in a private speech forum. By
contrast, such standards define legitimate government speech
through the selection of private speakers. What makes the use of
subjective standards to select among private speakers legitimate is a
structure and administration that demonstrates that such stan-
dards, rather than resulting in ad hoc viewpoint discrimination,
result in meaningful exercises of judgment by the government to
send a message through the private speech selections.
487. See id. at 298 (CowParade ran from June 15, 2000 until September 3, 2000.).
488. Id. at 301 n.7 ("In addition to PETA's submission here at issue, the three other de-
signs rejected were: 'Moni-Cow Lewinsky,' a caricature of Monica Lewinsky, disapproved as a
'gratuitous personal attack;' a cow dressed to resemble a Hasidic Jew viewed as potentially
'offensive or demeaning to Hasidic Jewry;' and a cow with a rubber 'stamp of approval'
deemed a political attack against the Mayor.").
489. Id. at 334 (holding that acceptance of the same anti-meat ideas in other quotes




The Constitution places different limits on the government de-
pending upon whether it is speaking or whether it is assisting
private speakers. Specifically, when the government speaks, it can,
and in fact must, engage in viewpoint discrimination. But, when it
merely facilitates private speech, the Constitution almost absolutely
forbids it to do so. When the government and private speakers in-
teract to produce expression, these different rules make it essential
to determine, in any particular instance, who's talking, while the
burgeoning variety of these interactions make it increasingly diffi-
cult to do so.
Because viewpoint discrimination by the government is the core
prohibition of the Free Speech Clause, the constitutional inquiry
must focus on whether the elements that render government
speech legitimate are present in a particular government/private
speech interaction. These elements of accountability for speaking,
identifiable and constitutionally valid message, and non-speech-
suppressing impact demonstrate, with respect to a particular act by
the government assisting private speakers, that the values that sup-
port government discretion to discriminate according to viewpoint
in its own speech outweigh the values that limit its ability to do so
outside this context.
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